

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM



市川

鬼童丸

團十郎


灸



THE ISHI PRESS

A traditional Go ban for under £200?

Here are good quality Go boards that don't cost a king's ransom! We recently acquired a limited stock of Korean-made agathis boards. Agathis is an Indonesian wood, for years an alternative to katsura. It is a bit harder and darker, but very suitable for Go boards. The best part about it is that it is half the price of Japanese-made katsura boards, and makes the luxury of a traditional board



or thick table board far more affordable. A honey-brown wood and authentic clamshell stones make a wonderful setting to play out your tesujis.

Choose a 4.5" thick traditional board together with large rose keyaki bowls and 9.2mm clamshell stones in our Myungin set, or a 2" table board in the Daewang set, also including medium chestnut bowls and 8mm clamshells. A very economical alternative is the Super Club set—2" board, ash bowls and glass stones!

	<u>Price</u>	<u>Postage nett</u>	
		<u>U.K.</u>	<u>Cont.</u>
☐ Myungin (B134, T375, S33J)	415	30	60
☐ Daewang (B110, T371, S30J)	230	15	30
☐ Super Club (B110, T350, S214)	110	10	16
☐ 4.5" Traditional Go ban only	195	15	30
☐ 2" Table board only	68	10	10


To order, send cheque or money order to Ishi Press International Ltd. Access/Euro-card/VISA welcome. Stop by the office next time you're in London. We stock the most complete range of Go products, plus Shogi, Chinese Chess, Mah Jong, and Puzzles. FREE catalogue available on request.



ISHI PRESS
INTERNATIONAL

20 Bruges Place, Baynes St., London NW1 0TE
Tel: 071-284-4898 FAX: 071-284-4899

Featured Articles in This Issue



The photo shows Ronald Schlemper defeating a world champion. This game was played in the final round of the 13th WAGC, after Imamura had already nailed down first place. Ronald beat the repre-

sentatives of both Japan and China, the most spectacular result yet by a Westerner in the world amateur championship. Both games are given in this issue.

Origin of the Rating System

Have you ever wondered about the origin of the rating system and why it only goes up to 9-dan? John Fairbairn believes he has found the answer in the course of his research into the history of go in ancient China. See his article 'Go Grades and Early Masters', beginning on page 58.

The Strongest Teenager in the World

Lee Changho's claim to be the strongest teenage go player in the world is incontestable. In this issue, we present some of the evidence, a win over his teacher, the current Ing World Champion Cho Hun-hyun (page 33). Lee is not invincible, however, as a loss to Yoda shows (page 34).

The cover: From a triptych by Toyoshige (signing as Toyokuni), published by Yamamotoya Heikichi ca. early 1830s.

A tense scene from an unidentified Kabuki play. The actors depicted are Onoe Kikugoro III (the far right panel, but not shown here), Ichikawa Danjuro VII (center) and the renowned actor of female parts Segawa Kikunojo V (left). Kikugoro's role is labelled Watanabe no Tsuna, and Danjuro is playing Kaidomaru a famous brigand who is sometimes confused in stories with the boy who became Sakata no Kintoki (see the cover article,

Raiko and the Ground Spider in Go World 62).

This design is a curious pastiche of elements from that tale. The figures at the right and left have been playing a mock game of go with chrysanthemum blossoms on a quilt patterned like a go board, and the spider web visible on the screen behind the standing figure gives a chilling hint of the Ground-Spider's presence. Kikunojo is dressed like a high-ranking courtesan, but the hairy mole on her right cheek (not a flaw in the print) suggests that all is not what it seems to be.

CONTENTS

Go World News	3
The 4th Fujitsu Cup	8
Round Two: Suh v. Nie	8
Round Two: O Rissei v. Cho Hun-hyun	11
Round One: Hane v. Qian	14
The 29th Judan Title, Game Three	16
The 15th Kisei Title	18
Game Four	18
Game Five	22
Game Six	25
Game Seven	29
Teacher v. Disciple in the Tongyang Cup	33
The Yoda-Lee Challenge Match, Game Three	34
Schlemper's Triumph in the WAGC	40
The Myriad Techniques of Go	43
Efficiency (2)	48
My Secret Strategies for Handicap Games	52
Go Grades and Early Masters	58

Go World is published by The Ishi Press, Inc.
 Address subscriptions to: The Ishi Press, Inc.
 CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan
 Editor: John Power

Yearly subscription rate: ¥5,000 (4 issues)
 Price per single issue: ¥1,250
 Airmail rate: ¥1,800 per issue; ¥7,200 a year
 Prices for back issues 1, 7—64: ¥1,250@

U.S. and Canadian subscribers order from:

ISHI PRESS INTERNATIONAL

76 Bonaventura Drive
 San Jose, California 95134-2123
 US\$20 per year; single copy price: US\$7
 Canada: US\$23 per year; single copy: US\$8

European and U.K. subscribers order from:

ISHI PRESS INTERNATIONAL, LTD.

20 Bruges Place
 London NW1 0TE, U.K.
 £20 per year; single copy price: £5

Go World is published quarterly by the Ishi Press, Inc., CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan and is distributed in the U.S. for \$20.00 per year by Ishi Press International, 76 Bonaventura Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-2123. Second-class postage paid at San Jose, California.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Ishi Press International, 76 Bonaventura Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-2123.

Note: Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

© Copyright 1991 in Japan by The Ishi Press, Inc. ISSN 0286-0376

All rights reserved according to international law. This magazine or any parts thereof may not be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher.

Go World News

International News

Rin and Lee Tied in Tongyang Cup

After two games in the final of the 3rd Tongyang Securities Cup, Rin Kaiho (Chinese Taipei/Nihon Ki-in) and Lee Changho (Korea) are even. The first game, played in Taipei on 18 September, was won by Rin (B) by half a point. Lee fought back to take the second, played on 20 September, by 1 1/2 points. This is an excellent performance by the 16-year-old Lee.

6th Super Go Series Tied 4-4

For the first time in a while, there is some suspense in the Super Go series between Japan and China. Two games have been played in the 6th series since our last report and it remains tied. Kataoka had publicly vowed to win five games for Japan, but his schedule was upset by Zhang Wendong 8-dan, who beat him in the 7th game of the series, played in Tokyo on 22 September, by 1 1/2 points. The score was evened again two days later when Awaji Shuzo 9-dan scraped past Zhang by half a point.

Sato Akiko Wins 3rd Women's Amateur Championship

Sato Akiko of Japan won the 3rd Yokohama Sotetsu Cup: World Women's Amateur Go Championship, held from 15 to 18 October, with a perfect record of seven wins.

Top places were as follows:

1st: Sato Akiko (Japan): 7-0

2nd: Kan Ying (Hong Kong): 6-1

3rd: Fang Fang (China), Kim Hae Sun (Korea): 5-2

5th: Yu Cong Phease (New Zealand): 5-2

6th: Marie Claire Chaine (France): 4-3

7th: Irina Guskova (USSR): 4-3

8th: Li Yun Ok (DPR Korea): 4-3.

This year 24 countries participated.

News from Japan

Kobayashi Defends Meijin Title

Kobayashi Koichi has defended the 16th Meijin title by the surprising margin of 4-1. It was expected to be a testing match for him, as Rin is one of the very few players with a plus record against Kobayashi, he had beaten him



Awaji evens the Super Go series for Japan

16th Meijin League Title-holder: Kobayashi Koichi

Rank	Player	O	T	C	A	R	Y	F	I	M	Score	Place
1	Otake	—	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	3 — 5	6
2	Takemiya	1	—	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	6 — 2	2
3	Cho Chikun	1	0	—	0	0	0	1	1	1	4 — 4	3
4	Awaji	1	0	1	—	0	0	0	0	1	3 — 5	—
5	Rin Kaiho	1	1	1	1	—	1	1	1	1	8 — 0	1
6	Yoda	0	0	1	1	0	—	1	1	0	4 — 4	4
7	Fujisawa S.	1	1	0	1	0	0	—	0	1	4 — 4	5
7	Ishii K.	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	—	0	2 — 6	—
7	Mimura	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	—	2 — 6	—

Note: The players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

in their only previous title match (the 1990 Tengen) and he was enjoying superb form, having just won the Meijin league with a perfect slate (the only previous player to do this was Ishida Yoshio in 1973: that was the year he challenged Rin Meijin and became the victim of the first-ever fightback from 0-3).

In an interview Kobayashi had indicated that he expected the series to be one of the crucial matches of his career: he was afraid that if he lost it his Kisei title would be the next to go.

The match was very hard fought, with new variations appearing in every game. Kobayashi showed great determination and a willingness to slug it out with Rin. According to Kobayashi himself, the turning point of the series was the third game, in which, with the series tied, he overcame a ten-point deficit in the endgame.

In his victory interview, Kobayashi frankly expressed his elation at beating 'a dangerous opponent like Rin'. For him, this was a much tougher match than the one-sided score might indicate.



Kobayashi keeps the Meijin title for another year. Prime Minister Kaifu: I envy him for having another term. (Cartoon by Ayuzawa Makoto)

47th Honinbo League (as of 1 November 1991) Title-holder Cho Chikun

Rank	Player	Ko	R	Ka	O	Ka	I	Ko	C	Score
1	Kobayashi K.							1		1 — 0
2	Rin Kaiho				0					0 — 1
3	Kataoka						1			1 — 0
4	Otake		1							1 — 0
5	Kato								0	0 — 1
5	Imamura			0						0 — 1
5	Komatsu	0								0 — 1
5	Chan Ka Yui					1				1 — 0

Note: Players are ranked according to results in the previous league.



The Meijin title match looked like developing into a close struggle when Rin won the second game, but . . .

The results:

Game 1 (11, 12 September, Singapore). Kobayashi (W) won by 2 1/2 points.

Game 2 (25, 26 September). Rin (W) by 2 1/2 points.

Game 3 (2, 3 October). Kobayashi (W) by 3 1/2 points.

Game 4 (16, 17 October). Kobayashi (B) by 5 1/2 points.

Game 5 (23, 24 October). Kobayashi (W) by 3 1/2 points.

16th Meijin League: Final Round Results

Rin had already secured the right to challenge by winning his 7th-round game, but the final round was crucial for some other players. Otake defeated Mimura and was very lucky to hold on to his place with only three wins while Awaji lost his with the same tally despite beating Cho. Takemiya beat Yoda: both retained their places. The remaining game was Rin's win over Ishii.

New Faces in 17th Meijin League

The three vacant places in the league have been won by Komatsu Hideki, who also won a place in the current Honinbo league, Iwata Tatsuaki and Awaji Shuzo.

Chan's Good Start in Honinbo League

Former world amateur champion Chan Ka Yui has got off to a surprisingly good start in his first Honinbo league by defeating past title-holder Kato Masao. Kobayashi Koichi seems headed for yet another challenge.

Kobayashi's Tough Gosei Defence

Last year Kobayashi Koichi rebuffed Kobayashi Satoru's challenge for the Gosei title with three straight wins. This year he seemed set to repeat this feat when he won the first two games against the same challenger, but then Satoru proved that he's a tougher player than last year by winning the next two. That really put the pressure on the champion, but he came good in the final game, in which he showed a return to his usual masterly form.

Kobayashi Satoru has gained in stature from his two Gosei challenges. In particular, he showed a new tenacity in the fourth game, in which he battled on courageously in a disadvantageous position and staged an upset.

Game 4 (19 August). Satoru (W) won by 1/2 point.

Game 5 (27 August). Koichi (B) won by resig.

Shuko Leads Hane in Oza Title

We hope our readers are as happy to read that headline as we are to write it. We have nothing against Hane and were very glad to see him win his first open title last year, but Shuko has always had a special place in this magazine, which started its life at the same time Shuko commenced his tenure as Kisei.

These days Shuko is a shadow of his former self, for a stomach ulcer and two bouts of cancer have reduced his weight from his 70 kilograms at his prime to 50, but his spirit is indomitable. At the age of 66, over eight years after he lost the Kisei title, he has set a new record: the oldest player ever to win an open title. He performed this feat by defeating Hane 3-1 in the title match. After a patient win in the first game and a reverse in the second, Shuko got into his stride by killing an enormous group (34 stones) in the third. His masterly play in the fourth game then won him his fourth Oza title, some 22 years after his previous victory.



Fujisawa Shuko: 'My understanding of go has improved since I was Kisei.'

The results:

Game 1 (4 October). Shuko (B) won by resig.

Game 2 (17 October). Hane (B) by resig.

Game 3 (22 October). Shuko (B) by resig.

Game 4 (28 October) Shuko (W) won by resig.

Kisei Challenger: Cho or Yamashiro

Cho Chikun and Yamashiro Hiroshi will meet in the best-of-three playoff to decide the challenger for the 16th Kisei title.

The results in the final section of the tournament were as follows:

Round 1. Fujisawa Shuko b. Yukawa 8-dan, Ohira Shuzo b. Kiyonari, Kato b. O Meien, Kobayashi Satoru b. Takemiya, Yamashiro b. Tei Meiko 8-dan, Moriyama 8-dan b. Otake, O Risei b. Rin Kaiho.

Round 2. Cho Chikun (seeded by lot into the second round) b. Shuko, Ohira b. Kato, Yamashiro b. Kobayashi, O b. Moriyama.

Semifinals. Cho b. Ohira, Yamashiro b. O.

Kato to Challenge Rin Tengen

Kato Masao has a chance to bring to an end his unaccustomed state as an untitled 9-dan. By defeating Yamashiro in the playoff, held on 10 October, he earned the right to challenge for the 17th Tengen title. Kato would seem to have a good chance of taking the title, as he has won five of his six title matches with Rin to date. He held the Tengen title for four years in a row from 1978 to 1981.

Kobayashi Chizu to Challenge for Women's Honinbo

Recently women's go in Japan has been dominated by young players aged around 20, but the older guard are making a comeback. First Sugiuchi Kazuko took the Women's Meijin title back from Aoki Kikuyo and now Kobayashi Chizu (who seems as young as ever, but now qualifies, at 37, as a 'veteran') will challenge the 20-year-old Nakazawa Ayako for the 10th Women's Honinbo title. She defeated another 20-year-old, Yoshida Mika 4-dan of the Kansai Ki-in, in the playoff, held on 4 September.

Cho Sonjin Wins 16th Shinjin-O

The 1991 final of this title for players up to 35 and under 8-dan featured a clash between two Nihon Ki-in players who hail from Korea: Cho Sonjin 6-dan (born in 1970) and Ryu Shikun 4-dan (born in 1971). Cho won the first game (2 September), Ryu the second (9 September) and Cho the third (16 September).

TV Titles

Cho Wins 24th Haya-Go Championship

Cho Chikun won this title for the second year in a row and the third time overall by defeating Yuki Satoshi 7-dan of the Kansai Ki-in in the final.

Aoki Wins Women's Kakusei

Aoki Kikuyo 4-dan defeated Shimazaki Shimako 2-dan in the final of the 13th Women's Kakusei Cup, held on 26 August. This was the first time Aoki has won this title. She has been enjoying superb form this year and as of 25 October her 1991 results are 31 wins to 9 losses (including an 18-game winning streak), which is probably one of the best records ever posted by a woman player at the Nihon Ki-in.

News from China

Ma Wins Individual Championship

The 1991 All-China Individual Championships were held in Beijing in the newly completed headquarters of the Chinese Weiqi Association from 5 to 18 September. Sixty-six players participated in the Men's Championship, an 11-round Swiss, which was won by Ma Xiaochun with ten wins. Second was Yu Bin 9-dan, who like Ma comes from Zhejiang

Province. These two players win places on the Chinese team in the 5th Fujitsu Cup.


Third place was taken by Yuan Yunsheng 7-dan, a new name to us but 40 years old. He was followed by Tan 7-dan, another new face, in 4th place, Cao Dayuan 9-dan in 5th, and Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan in 6th.

Yang Wins Women's Championship

Twenty-nine players competed in the Women's Championship, which was won by Yang Hui 8-dan of Shanghai with a score of 9-1. The best-known women players did not compete this time. Rui Naiwei 9-dan is now in Japan and recently took a job in the international division of a Japanese insurance company. Kong Shangming 8-dan, the wife of Nie, is also in Japan.

Women's Mingren Title

The 3rd Women's Mingren Title was held on Hainan Island at the beginning of October. The seven-round Swiss tournament was won by Ye Gui 2-dan, yet another new face in China, with six wins. Aoki Kikuyo 4-dan of Japan was invited to participate and did quite well, taking second place with 5-2. The top-ranked player participating, Yang Hui 8-dan, could only come 6th. *Continued on page 56.*



GO Workshop at Hollyhock

The focus of the workshop will be on improving your strategic decisions and broadening your whole board vision. Improving your tactics and local fighting will also be taught. — James Kerwin

Enjoy **July 6-11**, with James Kerwin, a professional shodan since 1978. Kerwin, a disciple of Iwamoto Kaoru, 9-dan, became the first Westerner to enter the record books of professional tournament Go when he won the 1-dan section of the 4th Kisei tournament in 1978. The workshop includes dan-level and kyu-level tournaments.



Hollyhock is located on Cortes Island, 100 miles north of Vancouver, Canada in a beautiful west coast beach setting. Tuition, dormitory accommodation and meals **\$630** Cdn. Tenting and private accommodation is also available. Please inquire.

Register by sending a \$100 deposit, phone with your credit card number, or write for a free brochure.

**Hollyhock, Box 127,
Manson's Landing, Cortes
Island, B.C. Canada V0P 1K0
(604) 935-6465**

◆ **WORKSHOPS IN THE PRACTICAL, CREATIVE & HEALING ARTS** ◆

The 4th Fujitsu Cup

A tournament of upsets

As reported in GW64, the final round of the Fujitsu Cup was a fiasco, with no opponents turning up to contest 1st and 3rd place, a double blow to the tournament sponsors unprecedented in go history. Cho Chikun must have mixed feelings about the way he became the Fujitsu World Champion. Perhaps fate was redressing the balance, for Cho Chikun had had to forfeit a Meijin-league game three days after his traffic accident in January 1986 (despite multiple injuries, he insisted on playing the first game of the Kisei title the following week). Since this unfortunate occurrence frees up some space in our magazine, we would like to continue our coverage of some of the more interesting games from the early rounds. The theme of the three games we present in this issue is an upset in two senses: first, the losers (in two of the games) were among the favourites to take the title; second, the players who took the lead in all three games suffered upsets within sight of victory.



Suh Bongsoo 9-dan

Born on 1 February 1953. Became shodan in 1970, 9-dan in 1986. In 1971, then 2-dan, won the Korean Meijin title, held it for five years in a row. In 1975, then 4-dan, won the Wangwi title; won it again in 1980. Won the Kuksoo title in 1988. At

present holds the Kukgi and two other titles. During the 1980's, he was Cho Hun-hyun's main rival.

Suh v. Nie (Round 2)

White: Suh Bongsoo 9-dan (Korea)

Black: Nie Weiping 9-dan (China)

Played in Tokyo on 6 April 1991.

Commentary by Otake Hideo 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)

48: ko; 50: connects

Figure 1 (1-50). New move not a success


This was Suh's first game ever with Nie. The latter was approaching this year's Fujitsu Cup more seriously than usual: taking a leaf out of Shuko's book, he had gone on the wagon and vowed not to have a drink until the tournament was over. For him, that came earlier than he was planning.

The highlight of the opening is Suh's bold contact play at 40. Otake: 'I've never seen this before.' The usual joseki is shown in *Dia. 1*. 'Suh has won a lot of titles, so, as you'd expect, he is courageous. In the first round he tried a new move against Sonoda and succeeded.'

However, giving Black the *ponnuki* loses points. 'I can't recommend this,' Otake concluded.



Suh (left) meets Nie. After a decade as Korea's number two, Suh is threatened by the rise of some formidable younger players in Korea, so he was anxious for success in the international arena.



Dia. 1




Figure 2 (51-73)

Figure 2 (51-73). White starts to catch up.

The result to 51 is a bit of a gain for Black, so he plays solidly with 53. 'This, of course, should be at 56,' said Otake.

Black 57 is also dubious. The squeeze from 58 to 68 is good for White: he flattens out Black's position and catches up a little. Black 57 should have been at A.

Black is attacking at the top with 69 and 71, yet Suh suddenly switches to the bottom with 72. That lets Black make a very severe attack at 73: White is on the spot. White should have used 72 to defend at B, which would have given a close game.

A fierce fight follows 73.

Fujitsu Cup results to date

1st (1988). 1st: Takemiya Masaki; 2nd: Rin Kaiho; 3rd: Nie Weiping; 4th: Kobayashi Koichi.

2nd (1989). 1st: Takemiya Masaki; 2nd: Rin Kaiho; 3rd: Cho Hun-hyun; 4th: Suh Bongsoo.

3rd (1990). 1st: Rin Kaiho; 2nd: Nie Weiping; 3rd: Kobayashi Koichi; 4th: Cho Hun-hyun.

4th (1991). 1st: Cho Chikun; 2nd: Qian Yuping; 3rd: O Rissei; 4th: Kobayashi Koichi.




Figure 3 (74-100)
99: ko





Figure 4 (101-150)



Dia. 2

Figure 3 (74-100). *Suh's misreading*

White 88 represents a change in course. Suh had planned to cut at 1 in *Dia. 2*, but he had misread the continuation. After 18 Black can capture the two corner stones, which is bad for White.

Figure 4 (101-150). *Don't fill in your own liberties.*

Black has succeeded in destroying White's top area, in sente, moreover. He also builds centre thickness with 11 and 13.

Otake: 'Black has done well. Nie's good at positional judgement; he probably believed he was in control of the game. My feeling is that with ordinary endgame Black looks like winning by seven or eight points on the board.'

Black 47. The exchange for 48, filling a black liberty, is bad. Or, having made this exchange, Black should immediately capture a stone with A.




Figure 5 (151-200)

ko: 66, 69; 88: takes two stones

Figure 5 (151-200). *A shock for Nie*

White 58 must have been a shock for Nie, for he promptly went wrong with 59. The ko after 62 is so big that Black will have to give up something somewhere else to win it, in which case 59 must be at A. Black 59 loses two points.

Otake: 'Using 58 to set up a ko is a tesuji that it would take a high-dan amateur player to find in actual play. A player who could solve it as an endgame problem would be amateur 2- or 3-dan.'

For Nie to miss such an easy tesuji by

professional standards shows that his concentration had slipped. Suh probably saw it immediately and, realizing that Nie had overlooked it, waited for the best time to play it.

In effect, Nie ignores the threat of 70 and finishes off the ko with 75. He loses about eight points in this ko fight — filling in that liberty was costly.




Figure 6 (201-265)

Figure 6 (201-265). *Bowing out early*

This year the finalists in the previous Fujitsu Cups all lost their first games. Perhaps that is not so surprising in a tournament that brings together the 24 top players from around the world. Still, one can't help wondering when Nie is going to win his first world championship.

White wins by 5 1/2 points.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri.)

O Rissei v. Cho Hun-hyun

(Round 2)

This is another exciting game in which the upset comes much later in the piece. In contrast to his first-round game with Liu, given in our previous issue, O Rissei was on the receiving end for most of this game.

White: O Rissei 9-dan

Black: Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan

Played in Tokyo on 8 April 1991.

Commentary by O Rissei.

Figure 1 (1-50). *Black's profit*

Black 27 is a very territorial move. Instead of 28, White could also have at A, pushing along for three moves, then switch to B. O: 'Takemiya might play that way.'

Black took profit in various places, but O felt that he had a reasonable game when he capped at 46.




Figure 1 (1-50)




Figure 2 (51-68)

Figure 2 (51-68). *O's miscalculation*

White 58 is a mistake. O expected Cho to answer at 2 in *Dia. 1* (next page), in which case he planned to start a fight with 3 and 5. Since White 1 steals Black's eye shape, White's prospects in this fight would be reasonable.

Black parries with 59 and 61. White 62 is




The game between Cho Hun-hyun (left) and O Rissei gets under way.

forced, so Black gets to play 63. Black's shape is stronger than in the diagram, so White's plan has been foiled.

O: 'At one stroke White 58 spoiled my game. I should have played at 60 immediately.'

White loses his temper when Black pushes along with 65 and 67, but cutting at 68 looks unreasonable.



Dia. 1

Figure 3 (69–100). A setback for O

White is forced to answer submissively up to 74.

White 82. If at 93, Black 84 splits up White's forces. Even so, when Black breaks through with 93, White's attack has clearly failed.

Figure 4 (101–150). Black keeps the initiative.

The players are fighting over who will get to play first on the left side: Black at 7 or

White at 10. If White plays there first, the game will still be close territorially.




Figure 3 (69–100)

White 6. White expects Black to defend in the centre, giving him sente to switch to 10, but Black calmly tenukis. When White plays 8, Black counters with 9, which, in O's words, is 'a clever, well-contrived move'. It combines attack and defence.

White 10. If the ordinary answer at 14, Black will cut at 12 and live in sente in the

centre. That is why O switches to 10, but although he cuts off Black 7, Black secures a large bottom territory and captures four stones in the centre.




Figure 4 (101-150)

41: connects (at 32); 46: ko (at 42)




Figure 5 (151-200)

Figure 5 (151-200). Not as big a lead as Cho thought

The 51-53-55 combination cuts off White's group. O: 'I thought I'd had it.' Cho certainly couldn't be blamed if he thought the game were over.

White 56-64. The aim of these moves is to create ko threats. White next plays 70 to start the ko fight, but Cho calculates he doesn't need this corner group, so he blithely discards

it. He makes good *aji* at the bottom with 71, and White takes the top with 72. O: 'Cho seems to have been under the impression that this put him way ahead, but actually the game was now countable.'




Figure 6 (201-242)


35: connects (below 27)

Figure 6 (201-242). Unbelievable

The problem comes up when White peeps with 18 and 20, then makes the nasty-looking slide to 22. Cho was fooled by this move into replying at 23. He then switched elsewhere after 24. The result is that White gets a *seki* in the corner.

O: 'Black's profit from capturing two white stones [with 27] is seven points, but the corner *seki* turns a 14-point black territory into zero. White gained seven points.'

Instead of 23, Black just had to play the simple combination of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*, and nothing would have happened.



Dia. 2

This game was the second last to finish, so there was a crowd of players watching the finish. O looked up at Rin and asked: 'Rin Sensei, how is it?' Kobayashi Koichi said: 'It must

be an upset. Hasn't White won?' O: 'I can't believe it.' Cho seemed to be in a state of shock. After a while he muttered: 'I thought I could afford a *seki* in the corner.' Either he had miscounted or simply not bothered to count properly after capturing the large white group at the bottom.

O: 'When he gave me the *seki* so readily, I couldn't believe I'd really won, so I asked Rin. You must never give up a game before it's over.'

White wins by 3 1/2 points.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri.)

Hane v. Qian (Round 1)

White: Hane Yasumasa 9-dan

Black: Qian Yuping 9-dan

Played on 6 April 1991.

Commentary by Hane.

Qian Yuping won his way through to the final this year, but perhaps his toughest game came in the first round. Hane himself tells the story of his missed opportunities.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). Qian's tenuki

Black 31. Black finds it too painful to take gote by reinforcing his bottom left group.

Black 49 may seem to be very narrow, but if Black plays A, White B becomes an ideal move.

White 50. Hane: 'I expected Black to answer by extending at C and I planned to attach at D next, but Black countered with 51

(Figure 2), so I played 54 as an emergency measure.'





Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (51-100). Wasting an advantage

Black 55. Better to play at 1 in Dia. 1. Black loses points, but White also becomes thin, so this is better than being subjected to a one-sided attack as in the game.

Black 61 stops White from linking up on the edge, but moving out into the centre is made harder by 62 and 64.

Black 67 is a sacrifice. If at 69, White will press at 73, making it hard for Black to move out because of his shortage of liberties.

Black finally extricates himself up to 79, but his shape has been ruined: he has made two empty triangles.

Hane: 'My mistake was to think that the game was over. I got carried away with 80. I should have made a hane at A. At this stage Black would have to answer at B, so I could then play 80.'

Black's counterattack with 83 and 85 is severe. White is forced to link up on a *dame*



Qian (left) makes a shaky start in what turns out to be his best performance in an international tournament.

point with 94 and his group at the top comes under attack. If White had made the hane of A, Black 83 would have been impossible because of shortage of liberties.

The game is now even.




Figure 3 (101–150)

Figure 3 (101–150). *A small lead*

White harasses Black effectively with 20 to 32. In order to live, Black has to sacrifice a stone with 23. Hane: 'When I enclosed the side

with 32, I thought I had a win.' However, he proceeds to make a number of slips.

Hane: 'White 34 should be at 37. I didn't realize how big 35 and 37 were. With 38, I should have emphasized the centre more by playing a hane at A.'

Even so, White is still a little ahead.





Figure 4 (151–200)

Figure 4 (151–200). *Saving a point backfires.*

White 52 is the first factor in White's

defeat. Hane: 'I should have captured from the top with White 53. Trying to avoid a loss of one point cost me many times as much.' If White 53, Black A will be sente. When Hane played 52, he hallucinated he could play 58 at 59, but *Dia. 2* shows that he is captured.

White changes course with 58. When Black plays 59, White's centre thickness disappears. He can't expect to make any territory there at all now. Hane: 'If White had played 56 at 57, the game might still have been close.'



Dia. 2

Figure 5 (201-256). *It's not over till it's over.*

Ma also came from behind in his win over Takemiya in the first round, so this was truly a

tournament of upsets.

Black wins by 2 1/2 points.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri. Translated by John Power.)




Figure 5 (201-256)

56: connects (right of 52)


29th Judan Title, Game Two

This year's Judan title match showed that the Takemiya moyo is alive and healthy. The three wins that kept him the title all came from large moyos. In this issue we would like to present the second game. We hope to find space for more games from the match in our next issue.


White: Cho Chikun, Honinbo

Black: Takemiya Masaki, Judan

Played on 28 March 1991.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1-27)

It's unlikely the sequence in the bottom

right corner has been seen before. For once we see Takemiya playing on the second line (17 and 27) early in the game.




Figure 1 (1-27)

Instead of 17, the usual move is 1 in *Dia. 1*. The players agreed that the result to 14 would have been a little slack for Black.

Black 27 enables him to cope with the cut in *Dia. 2*. Instead of 26, White should perhaps have played atari at 27, then switched elsewhere.





Figure 2 (28-70)



Dia. 3

5: ko; 7: connects

Figure 2 (28-70)

Black ignores 28 (played to forestall Black A) and 30, convinced that securing the bottom can't be bad. White continues to develop rapidly with 34, but Black is ahead.

White 36 may be dubious. White is forced to play on the right side with 42, but his previous moves 28 and 38 have rendered this area valueless (because Black has no potential to make territory there). Black is happy when he takes the key point of 49.

However, Takemiya's strategy of capturing two stones with 63 on is also dubious. Expanding his moyo as in *Dia. 3* would be better. White 68 and 70 make the game close.

Figure 2 (71-119)

The game will be decided by how much territory Black gets in the centre. White 92 and 94 are the losing moves (Cho was already in *byo-yomi*, as he spent most of his time on the opening exchange in the bottom right corner). They let Black block off the centre with 93 and 95, securing an enormous territory. Cho perhaps overlooked the fact that Black could give way with 97. White 112 is no threat to Black.

Instead of 92, White should have followed *Dia. 4*, which apparently would have made the game a half-pointer.

This game was a one-sided victory for the Takemiya moyo.

White resigns after Black 119.

(Kido, June 1991)





Figure 3 (71-119)



Dia. 4

The 15th Kisei Title Match

Games Four to Seven

We resume our coverage of this year's Kisei title with Kobayashi one ahead, having won the second and third games after dropping the first to the challenger Kato Masao.

Game Four

White: Kato Masao

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played in Tokuyama City on 20, 21 February 1991.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-33)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1-33). *Diminishing framework*

Kobayashi put his unique stamp on the opening at Black 15 (most pros would play A or B), Black 27 (a Kobayashi favorite), and Black 29 (instead of 30). Even making allowances for Kobayashi's style, however, it's hard to

approve of Black 33, because Black is diminishing his own framework on the lower side. Black 1 in Dia. 1 is preferable. Black welcomes the running battle started by White 2, since Black 3, 5, and 7 cancel White's power on the left side.





Figure 2 (34-59)



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (34-59). *Questionable tesuji*

White 34 to 38 prepare for the crosscut at 40 and 42, but the crosscut tesuji itself is questionable. Ishida recommended playing both 40

and 42 at 44. Kobayashi was anticipating White 40 at 44 and planning to reply at A. *Dia. 2* shows the variation with White 42 at 44. White gets a good, wide position with 1 to 7.

Black 43 etc. follow almost automatically from White 42, and Black does well by breaking out into the center with 57. White does not try to enclose Black by trading White 51 for Black B before playing 50, because then Black A, White C, Black D is severe.





Figure 3 (60-73)



Dia. 3

Figure 3 (60-73). *Doubtful invasion*

Black continues to do well until he invades at 73. After this things start to go wrong.

Dia. 3 shows the easiest way for Black to play. Black bluffs an attack with 1 and 3, invades with 5, and reaches a safe position and a slight lead with 11. If White plays 4 at 'a', Black

attacks in earnest with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', and White is forced to struggle.






Figure 4 (74-81)



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Figure 4 (74-81). *Kobayashi gambles.*


In reply to White 74 Black should jump to 1 in *Dia. 4*. After White 2 to 6, however, Black is not connected as well as in *Dia. 3*, and has no satisfactory way to reinforce his connection. Kobayashi therefore gambled on Black 75.

Black 77 should be 1 in *Dia. 5*. By playing 1, 3, and 5 before attaching at 7 Black can keep White from getting a large territory in the center. When White hanes at 8, Black crosscuts at 9 (not Black 'a', White 'b', which might fail to live). White's strongest resistance is 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 6*, but Black counters with the nose attachment at 6. If White plays 7, Black 8 makes a shape that should be capture-proof even

against the likes of Kato.


If White pushes in at 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black blocks at 2. White must play 3 and 5 to avoid losing the capturing race. Black plays 6, applies straightforward squeeze tactics with 8 to 14, then makes an eye with 16. *Dia. 8* shows the likely continuation. Black comes out safe with resources to spare, including the ko at Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 78 is a well-timed probe. If Black answers at A, White plays B, Black C, White D, and Black is in trouble.



Dia. 6

Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Figure 5 (82-100). Misjudgement

If Kobayashi had made the effort he could easily have read out the variations in *Dias. 5* to 8. Instead, he let White have a ponnuki at 86 and settled for a minimal life through Black 99. He undoubtedly thought he was securing the

lead but he was badly mistaken. White gained much more territory in the center than he lost on the left side. Far from being in the lead, Black now had a virtually unwinnable game.




Figure 5 (82-100)




Figure 6 (101-134)

24,27: ko


Figure 6 (101-134). Kobayashi abandons hope.

Kobayashi finally woke up to the situation when White peeped at 2. If Black makes a bamboo joint at 1 in *Dia. 9*, White plays 2 to 6. White has unlimited ko threats on the right side, so Black's position is hopeless.


After thinking for a long time, Kobayashi answered at 3. After this he made some uncharacteristic careless mistakes, such as Black 9 (Black 12, White 10, Black 11 is at least one point better). He had apparently already abandoned hope.



Ishida Yoshio shows a keen interest in the review of the game.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

At Black 15, Kobayashi missed his last chance when he failed to extend at 1 in *Dia. 10*. The continuation is extremely difficult. At some point White has to return to 4, but then Black can connect at 5. White can capture five stones with 6 to 14, but Black squeezes with 15 and takes away enough of White's center to

win the game

Dia. 10 shows only one of many variations. White may compromise by playing 6 at 12, followed by Black 6, White 14; or Black might use 3 to give atari at 'a'. Almost anything might have happened if Black had played 1, and Black might yet have emerged on top.

White wins by 5 1/2 points.

(Kido, April 1991. Translated by James Davies.)




Figure 7 (135-232)

85, 87: connect. White wins and connects the ko.



Despite his self-proclaimed bad form, Kato was doing well: he was the first challenger to take more than one game from Kobayashi in a Kisei title match.

Game Five

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Kato Masao

Played in Sapporo on 27, 28 February 1991.

Commentary by Takagi Shoichi 9-dan.

With the series level at 2-all, this looked like being the crucial game. Both players showed abundant fighting spirit. The highlight of the game is an unusual *furikawari*.





Figure 1 (1-35)

Figure 1 (1-35). *Profiting from past experience*

The fuseki to 6 is the same as in Game One. Concerning Black 7, Kato commented: 'I won the first game, but my fuseki was bad, so I tried something different.'

The extension of 11 has become popular recently. White 12 is most often played at A, but Kobayashi likes the solid connection. He also played it in the first game of the 1989 Gosei title match. The same shape was created as here, but in a different order of moves (see *Dia. 1*).

Kato spent 26 minutes on 13. 'I wanted to play B, but since it was an important game I decided to play cautiously.'



Dia. 1

White 18 may look narrow, but when Kobayashi made a wide extension in the Gosei game he got into trouble. He extended to 30 in *Dia. 1*, and later Imamura separated the stones with Black 'a' through 'g'.

White 32. Takagi: 'This is the Kobayashi style. If White simply jumps to C, he comes under attack from Black D. Moreover, if White plays 32 later, he can't be sure it will be sente. The presence of 32 enables White to jump out one line further with 34.'

Black 35. Black could also extend two spaces down the right side from 27, but then White secures a large corner with E. Fighting spirit makes 35 the only move.

Figure 2 (36-62). *Against the logic of go?*

White 46. Kobayashi: 'This may go against the logic of go, but anything else is inconceivable.'

If Black loses the ko, the exchange of 37 for 38 becomes a very bad one, which is perhaps why Kobayashi decided on the *furikawari*.

This is a very unusual trade: one rarely sees the opponent permitted successive moves like 45 and 47, especially so early, in a professional game. Apparently each side believed that he profited. Opinion among fellow professionals was likewise divided.





Figure 2 (36-62)

Black 53 can't be omitted after 52.

White 54 is a good move: this was probably the second factor inducing Kobayashi to make the trade. If White makes the usual move of 57, there will be too big a gap between these stones and the centre group below.

Black 55 and 57 lose points but keep sente so that he can defend at 61. If Black played 57 at 59, White would invade at A at the bottom. Takagi 9-dan showed the variation in *Dia. 2*. Black gets three eyeless groups.



Dia. 2





Figure 3 (63-100)



Dia. 3

Figure 3 (63-100). White moves ahead.


Black 63. The sealed move.

The morning session on the second day was when Kato lost the game. First, Black 67 is too small. Black should extend to 1 in *Dia. 3*. If White 2, Black simply plays 3 and has nothing to worry about. White is not likely to lose the marked stone, but even so this is far better for Black than the result in the figure.

White 80 is a good move: it defends against the cut following Black A. The game seems to turn in White's favour around here. Black links up with 83, but his shape is imperfect.

Black 93 was the move Kato himself labeled the losing move. White would usually play 94 one line above 89, but descending at 94 sets up the endgame move of 98.

After the game the players looked at various alternatives for 93. *Dia. 4* shows one of them. This way Black would still have a chance.





Kobayashi looks happy at taking the lead again. Yamabe seems to be harboring inner doubts about the wisdom of the play.

Game Six

White: Kato Masao

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played in Gifu City on 13, 14 March 1991.

This game is an uncharacteristic failure for Kobayashi. His typical winning pattern is to take a lead, then to concentrate on expanding it while eliminating all unfavourable *aji* or possibilities of complications. For once, however, he chose the more dangerous course of trying to annihilate his opponent instead of simply nursing his lead. Kato is an expert at killing groups, but he showed that he also knows a thing or two about rescuing them.

Our commentary focuses on Kobayashi's fateful strategic decision.

Figure 1 (1–50). *New variations on an old theme*

The opening to 21 is exactly the same as in Game Two. The variation from 22 to 29 was referred to in the review of that game.

Black 35 leads the game into different channels. Descending at Black 36 instead

would be big, but Kobayashi is aiming at 41, so he wants to build strength at the top.

White 40. Kato makes a narrower extension than in Game Two, where he played A.

The fight after 41 seems tough for White, but he uses the well-timed sacrifice of 48 to set up a good forcing move at 50.




Figure 1 (1–50)




Figure 2 (51-100)
66: connects

Figure 2 (51-100). Kato cedes the key point to Black.

Black 51 is painful, but Black 52 would just help White to make shape.

The white group is more or less settled after 62: Black doesn't have any severe attack for White to worry about. The game looks interesting for White.

The flow of the game changes with 76 and 77. The former is a very tempting forcing move — Black's best answer is the submissive A. However, Kobayashi has taken the precaution of ensuring that he can live even if he ignores 76. Thanks to the forcing moves of 69 and 71, he can capture three stones with Black B.

Instead of 76, jumping to White 77 was the only move. If Kato had lost the game, then 76 would have been the losing move. Kobayashi was very happy at getting the chance to attack at 77.

White has to flee on *dame* or worthless points with 78 and 80, as he has only one eye in gote on the side.

Kato: 'This was terrible. The comparison between the two white moves of 78 and 80 and the two black moves of 79 and 83 is ridiculous.' White's *moyo* at the top has been wiped out.

White 84 is an overplay — better to play more patiently with White C. Black 85 is a severe counterattack. White resists with 88, but Black is easily able to move into the bottom

area.

White 90. The sealed move.





Figure 3 (101-138)

Figure 3 (101-138). 'Kobayashi the killer?'

Living with a bare two eyes up to 14 is painful. However, 16 and 20 show that Kato's spirit is uncowed. A reinforcement at 38 looks advisable, but Kato decides to maintain territorial balance, defying Black to kill his group.


The moves from 25 to 31 are the key moves. Black attacks White's eye shape up to 29, then makes the blunt atari of 31. This shows that he is determined to kill the centre white group. According to Ishida Yoshio, who analysed the position in depth for *Kido*, the conventional approach would be to follow Dia. 1.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. According to Ishida, Black 1 and 3 represent the safety-first approach. If White plays 'a' next, Black plays 'b' and threatens to attack the group below with 'c'; White will have a hard time rescuing his three stones (including 2 and 'a') because Black 'd' will be absolute sente. If, on the other hand, White lets Black squeeze with 'a' etc., then his centre group will now be in real danger. Following this diagram might lead to a drawn-out game, but it looks like the safe way to win.

Black 35 and 37 make very bad *aji*. If Black plays 37 at 1 in *Dia. 2*, however, White will counter with 2 to 10, then strike at 12. This puts Black on the spot. White has the threats of cutting at 'a' and wedging in at 'b'. He also has the possibility of White 'c'—Black 'd', White 'e' at the top.



Dia. 2

Figure 4 (139–166). Kobayashi's oversight

Black 51. If Black plays at 2 in *Dia. 3*, hoping to set up a double attack on the centre group and the group at the bottom, White counters with the superb tesuji of 3. If Black 'a', then White 'b' secures the centre group in sente, giving White time to take care of the bottom group. If instead Black plays 'b', then White plays 'a', Black 'c'; that creates the threat of 'd', so the bottom group will be safe.

It may appear after the above commentary that attempting to kill the white group was rash, but that is not true either. Kobayashi: 'Having set out to kill the group, the onus was on me to do the job properly.' In further re-

search after the game he did find a way. Instead of 35 in the previous figure, Black should have followed *Dia. 4* (next page). The group does seem to be dead after Black 12; if White plays 'a', Black answers with 'b' and, despite some bad *aji*, he seems to be able to make the kill.






Figure 4 (139–166)



Dia. 3

Kobayashi's judgment that the group was killable was not astray, therefore. The problem was that he overlooked the clever move of 66 — proof he's only human after all. Both players must have read an immense number of moves during this fight; unfortunately for Kobayashi, the key move slipped through his net.




Dia. 4

After having taken profit in various places, Kato finally sets about making his centre eyes with 62.

White 66 is a clever move, securing eye shape in sente. If White simply takes a stone with 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black 2 will be sente; if White A, Black connects at B, so White can't get a second eye here. That means that he will be forced to add a stone at A in the figure, giving Black the chance to attack the bottom group with C, then D, in the diagram.

When Kobayashi saw 66, he knew he had lost. The game was now a close contest on the board.



Dia. 5

Figure 5 (167–200), Figure 6 (201–271)

White 2 is slack: it should be at 11. Some other slack moves let Kobayashi narrow the gap, but losing by half a point probably was all the more painful.

Hane Yasumasa had a pertinent comment: 'To rescue a weak group, you usually have to give up something somewhere else, but Kato is very clever at saving his groups without paying a price. I know what I'm talking about

from first-hand experience.'

Ishida Yoshio conjectured that Kobayashi's upset losses in the first and fourth games probably influenced his decision to attack rather than try to win the slow way. Whatever the reason, it gave Kato the chance he needed to even the series. He himself may have been unhappy with his form, but this series had turned into the most serious challenge Kobayashi had yet faced in the Kisei title.

White wins by 1/2 point.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri and Kido, May 1991.)




Figure 5 (167–200)

94: connects




Figure 6 (201–271)

65: connects (at 4); 69: connects (at 56);
70: connects (at 19); 71: connects (below 41)

Game Seven

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Kato Masao

Played in Urayasu City on 19, 20 March 1991.

The commentary on the final game takes the form of an interview by Akiyama Kenji for *Igo Club* with Kobayashi. This game was played after a break of only four days, but Kobayashi commented that it worked out better not having a long time to reproach himself for his upset loss in the sixth game. The game followed a different pattern this time, with Kobayashi the one staging an upset.






Figure (1-38)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1-38). Affected by the pressure

IC: The general feeling was that the new pattern in the upper right corner was a little slack for Black. After the game Kato looked at the joseki in *Dia. 1*.

KK: I think that this joseki is reasonable for White. He gets a lot of territory.


IC: What about the theory that Black should play 27 at 1 in *Dia. 2*?

KK: That doesn't feel good after White 2 and 4. With the threat of the cut at 'a', it's easy for White to reduce the moyo with 'b'. I thought the sequence to 27 was reasonable for both sides.

White doesn't feel like playing the high move of A instead of 30. Having Black enter later at B would be unbearable.

IC: I understand the meaning of the moves up to 35, but the next three moves seem to be too tight. White 36 in particular was badly received by the spectators — it seemed much too tight. Someone said it's the kind of move you keep in reserve for the final game.

KK: You tense up without realizing it. At the time it seemed about right to me, but perhaps after all I should have capped at 1 in *Dia. 3*. Black 2 is the only move, so White 3. At this point there were various things I was worried about. If Black 4, White has to give way with 5 and 7. Or Black may do something violent like Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. However, with 36 my guard does seem to have been too tight.



Dia. 3

IC: The opinion of Shuko, the referee, was that he'd prefer to play 37 at C, building a bigger moyo.

KK: I didn't know how to play with 38. Other conceivable moves are White C, White D, and also White E, but C and D didn't appeal to me because they're so thin. White E is too lacking in efficiency. So I concluded it might be better to convert the left side into

secure territory with 38.

IC: Someone speculated that you played solidly with 36 and 38 because you thought you'd profited on the top right.

KK: No, I don't believe I made so much profit there.





Figure 2 (39-67)



Dia. 4

Figure 2 (39-67). A resolute sacrifice

IC: White 42 and 44 are the Kobayashi-style *kime-uchi* (settling the shape).

KK: White couldn't expect anything better than this, so I thought settling the shape was natural, but Kato said that he was grateful. The difference in our ways of thinking here is interesting. I was worried that Black might use 43 to play 1 in Dia. 4. Extending at 2 is the only move, but these stones are swallowed up after 3 to 9. Black does develop at a slower pace

than in the game, so it is probably hard to say which is better.

IC: White 50 was the sealed move. Black's next move is incredible.


KK: Giving up the two stones costs him ten points, in White's sente. I thought there was a ten percent chance he'd do this, but I didn't really expect him to. But this was a good strategy. Black's solid wall of thickness limits White's options. He's refusing to be dragged into a fight.

IC: If Black makes the ordinary extension of 1 in Dia. 5?

KK: I was planning to start a fight with 2 to 5. It's frightening, but I had a feeling White could handle the fight one way or another. If White uses 4 to extend at 5, Black secures his territory with 4 and I couldn't be confident.

IC: You play the same move in the game [58].

KK: Anything else and Black will beat me easily. But, natural though it was, Black 59 was severe. Black is aiming at the cut with Black A, White B, Black C. If Black attaches at D instead of 59, extending at E will be good enough for White now that he's taken profit on the left.




Dia. 5

IC: Black expands his territory by capturing a stone with 61 and 63. It was around here that everyone in the pressroom was getting excited, anticipating the birth of a new Kisei.

KK: White can't do better, considering the power of Black's position. My positional judgement was funny. I didn't think the game was bad for me yet, but this seems to be a loss.

IC: Black 67 was the problem move. Everyone agreed that blocking off the centre with the commonplace move of 1 in *Dia. 6* would have been better.



Dia. 6

KK: I planned to jump in at 2, but when Black ataris at 5, he looks like winning big. Not being able to pick up extra points by attacking the top-right black group is painful. So White would have more chance if he answered Black 1 by extending at 5. Assuming that Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' follow ... H'm, Black seems to be a little ahead. Perhaps that means that 36 in Figure 1 was dubious.

IC: Ishida Akira had an interesting comment. He said that because you looked so confident Kato may have had doubts about his strategy and looked for a severer move.

KK: Then I gained from being an optimist. (laughter) At any rate, Black 67 helped me out. I was just lucky.

Figure 3 (68–100). *The game and the title are decided.*

KK: Although Black pushes through up to 75, his centre disappears, on top of which the marked stone becomes a wasted move. No matter how you look at it, White gains in this exchange.

IC: Either Kato was too pessimistic or too optimistic — I wonder which it was. Looking at 87 and 91, you get the feeling he may have been overoptimistic. There was a theory that the game wouldn't have been bad for him if he'd used 87 to descend at 1 in *Dia. 7*.





Figure 3 (68–100)



Dia. 7

KK: Really? I haven't examined the endgame in detail, so I'd better be careful what I say. Let's have a proper look at it. Sliding to 2 is the only move. If instead White plays 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', then Black blocks at 'd' and White can't win. Black defends at 3, and the continuation is similar to the game. Eh? Black is winning by a little. The game was actually quite bad for White. I see, I was luckier than I realized. Black 87 may have been the losing move.

IC: What if Black uses 91 to block at 95?

KK: Playing White A through Black D in sente is big, so it's doubtful Black would win.

IC: In the pressroom the general opinion was that it would have been a half-pointer.

KK: No, I don't agree. The margin is a little

greater. However, Black 99 made it definite.

IC: I don't understand this move. It's thick, but it feels like a *dame* point.





Figure 4 (101-150)

18: connects



Dia. 8

Figure 4 (101-150). White can't do better.

KK: The aim of 99 in Figure 3 was to make sure that 7 here would be sente. Even so, it's too small. Black 1 in *Dia. 8* takes immediate profit. White will force with 2 and 4, then play 6. Assuming that White answers 9 in gote with 10 and 12 . . . In this variation Black can only win by about three points on the board.

IC: In the game White is playing on the edges and Black is concentrating on the centre.

KK: If he plays ordinary moves he can't win, so Kato is trying something different. That caused the gap to widen a little. There's

nothing to comment on in the rest of the endgame.

IC: It was a bit of a letdown to see how unemotional the two of you were after the conclusion of such an important match.

KK: We were exhausted! It's like when you reach the finishing line in a marathon — there are no reserves of strength left. It's exhausting when the series goes the full distance.

IC: Maybe it's because it's so exhausting that there's the jinx that you lose the year after a seven-game defence. So next year is going to be dangerous for you.

KK: I don't know if I'll have the strength next year to overcome the jinx. I realize it's going to get harder every year. The only thing is to fight with all my might.

White wins by 4 1/2 points.

(Igo Club, June 1991. Kisei report translated by John Power.)




Figure 5 (151-206)



Teacher v. Disciple in the Tongyang Cup



Lee Changho, who turned 16 on 29 July this year, has a chance to win a world championship.

As reported in our news section, the final of the 3rd Tongyang Securities Cup, a Korean international tournament with a first prize of 50 million won (about \$74,000) is being fought between the veteran player Rin Kaiho (representing Chinese Taipei) and the youthful star of Korean go, Lee Changho. So far, the score in the best-of-five playoff is even, with one win each.

In winning his way to the final, Rin Kaiho brushed aside the opposition of Cho Chikun with two straight wins; Lee had a tougher time, but he managed to prevail against his teacher, the Korean number one Cho Hun-hyun, 2-1. We would like to present the deciding game from their semifinal. It is a game full of fierce fighting, and it shows just how strong Lee is getting.

White: Lee Changho 5-dan

Black: Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan

Played in Seoul on 17 June 1991.

Figure 1 (1-50)

Black 31 is aggressive. Cho must have lacked confidence in the *moyo* contest following 31 at 32. White's natural counter at 32 starts the first fight.

Moves like 45 and 47 show Black's desire to avoid making a heavy group.




Figure 1 (1-50)

42: connects; 50: connects




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100)

Lee seems to have overlooked Black 55. His group to the left is in considerable danger.

Black 85 looks ominous, but White parries the attack by sacrificing two stones.

The advantage Black has gained in the fighting at the top is wasted when he plays 97. If he had defended the bottom with a move around 98, he would clearly have been ahead.




Figure 3 (101–150)
13: connects

Figure 3 (101–150)

Black 1 is the strongest move, but White can afford the time to reinforce on the side with 2. His stone at the bottom can't be captured, as he demonstrates up to 20.

Black 21. For the second time Cho plays an irrelevant move. White 22 is the vital point,

setting up effective moves at 24 and 26. Black 21 loses the game.




Figure 4 (151–208)

Black tries to build up his right side with 31 on, but he can't get enough.

Moves 219 to 290 omitted. White wins by 7 1/2 points.

(Go Weekly, 9 July 1991)

The Yoda-Lee Challenge Match

One of the more novel events of 1991 was the best-of-five challenge match between two young players representing Japan and Korea. The idea for the match came from the good showing made by Lee Changho in international tournaments recently. Matching him against Yoda Norimoto was logical in one sense, for Yoda's position as the top player of the younger generation in Japan is undisputed. The Nihon Ki-in magazine *Igo Club* sponsored the match, offering a prize of ¥3,000,000 (about \$22,000) to the winner. The contest caught the fancy of the Korean go public, and there was massive press coverage of the opening two games, which were played in Seoul.

In some respects the pairing was not so apposite. Yoda is the leading young Japanese player, but he has already enjoyed that distinc-

tion for seven years, whereas barely two years have passed since Lee made his debut. Although Yoda was a member of both the Honinbo and Meijin leagues at the time of the match, he has yet to challenge for an open title, whereas Lee held three Korean titles. The latter had already established himself as the number two player in Korea and in fact can be considered one of the great prodigies of go history. Yoda was also a youthful sensation at the age of 18, when he set a record by winning a place in the Meijin league, but, now 25, he is still waiting for the Kitani disciples who dominate Japanese go to move over and make room for him at the top.

These reservations did not weigh with the go public or detract from the interest of the clash. When the match got under way, it turned out that Yoda's greater experience gave

him the edge. The games in Seoul were split, with Yoda winning the first (2 February) by 2 1/2 points and Lee the second (4 February) by 4 1/2 points, but when the venue switched to Tokyo Yoda quickly wrapped up the series. He won the third game (26 March) by 2 1/2 points and the fourth (28 March) by resignation.

We would like to present the third game. It was the most interesting of the series and featured a joseki innovation by Lee.

Game Three

White: Yoda Norimoto 8-dan

Black: Lee Changho 4-dan

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 3 hours each.

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 26 March 1991.

Commentary by Awaji Shuzo 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-22)

Figure 1 (1-22). Merits of the new move


Black 15 is the new move. Lee: 'I've wanted to play this peep for some time.'

The most common move is Black 1 in *Dia. 1*. White secures a base with 2 and 4; if Black expands the bottom moyo with 5, White cuts at 6.


White 16 is the fighting answer to 15. If instead he connects at 2 in *Dia. 2*, then attaching at 4 does not work as well as in *Dia. 1*. Black can seal him in in sente with 5 and 7.

White 18. Awaji: 'This is a bit too crude for my taste. Playing 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3* would be the usual approach here, I think.' Ishida Akira added a comment: 'Isn't cutting at 'a' with 3, to


see how Black answers, the correct timing?' The other professionals following the game in the pressroom also felt 18 was dubious. They also queried Black 21, advocating attacking at 1 in *Dia. 4* instead. If White plays 2 to forestall Black 'a', Black extends at 3, creating a large-scale position.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Extending to 22 gives White a comfortable position. Even so, the consensus was that the result of the new pattern was pretty close to even. Turning at 21 does make Black very thick.

Note that if White omits 22, the 1-3 combination in *Dia. 5* will be very severe.



Dia. 5





Figure 2 (23-53)



Dia. 6

Figure 2 (23-53). Lee declines to attack.

Black 25 to 31 seems to be one of Lee's favourite patterns.

Black 37 is a good attacking move. White seeks *sabaki* with 38. Up to 42, he seems to create a good target for Black to aim at, but for some reason Lee switches to 43.

Awaji: 'Apparently it would have been better to take away White's eye shape with 1 in Dia. 6. White will have to reinforce with something like 4, so Black could then invade at 5. Extending to 'a' instead would also be big.' After 1, White has no good way of protecting his cutting point, so Black is left with the thick move of 'b' for later.

Lee's plan seems to have been to take profit, then to attack with 53 after inviting

White to descend at 52. Awaji: 'I wonder if Lee hasn't made an oversight here.'






Figure 3 (53-76)

ko: 68, 71; 73: connects



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Figure 3 (53-76). Inconsistent play by Lee

White 54 and 56 are a tesuji. Lee was expecting White 58 at 1 in Dia. 7. He must have been upset with himself, for he took a long time to make his moves here, though he had little choice. The sequence to 62 is much better for White than Dia. 7.

White 64. The hane of 1 in Dia. 8 is what Black wants, as he has ko threats at 4. If he won this ko, it would cancel out his earlier mistake.


Black 65, 67. If Black is going to fight this ko, then the exchange of 63 for 64 is clearly funny. Without it, he could play 67 at 56. Lee's

bad play here is a sign that he was not in full command of himself.

Ignoring the ko threat of 72 is surprising: White 74 is too good. Defending with 75 also caused some astonishment. O Meien: 'I'd sooner die than play 75. I'd go crazy and try to kill the centre white group. Though there's no chance of its dying.'

White 76 is thick: it could be considered a declaration of victory. Note that Black makes no move to attack the centre white group. Yoda: 'Lee probably concluded he would have had fewer chances of winning if he made a sudden attack that resulted in the group getting definite life.'

The best move for attacking is probably 1 in *Dia. 9*. Yoda: 'Crude or not, I'd make eyes with 2 to 10.' White's play here does seem submissive, but it would simplify the game.



Dia. 9

Figure 4 (77–102). Yoda plays solidly.

After Black plays 77, the sequence in *Dia. 9* may work better for Black. At any rate, White deems it advisable to reinforce at 78.

Black 85. Awaji: 'This cut is well-timed. The stones at 85 and 87 function as forcing moves.'

White should peep at A before Black plays at 99

Figure 5 (103–149). Lee suddenly starts to catch up.

White 4 is smaller than it looks; apparently White A is better. Black 13 is a good follow-up to 3; White has to add a stone at 22.

After 23, it becomes obvious that not peeping at B was a slip.




Figure 4 (77–102)





Figure 5 (103–149)


White 26 helps Black by provoking 27. Instead, White should simply extend at C. Black gets a large centre up to 33. If White had played 26 at C, Black wouldn't have found it so easy to wall off the centre.

The game has become uncomfortably close for Yoda, considering the size of the lead he established earlier.

Just before Yoda played 38, Otake commented in the pressroom that there was a way for White to get a sure win. The move is White 1 in *Dia. 10* (next page). If Black gives way with 2, cutting off a stone with 3 is big. If Black resists with 2 in *Dia. 11*, he has no answer to White 3. Black 4 gives White a dangerous move at at 5.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11




Figure 6 (150-200)

Figure 6 (150-200). Lee misses his chance.


The players in the pressroom were startled when White answered 63 by blocking at 64. At this moment there was the possibility of an upset.

Awaji: 'If White had given way with 64 at 65, he would have been definitely ahead.' In *byo-yomi*, Lee made the reflex answer of 65. This sealed the fate of his game.

The wedge of 66 was the move Yoda had been relying on. This fight ended safely for him when he played 70 and 72. It became apparent that the cut of 65 was a slight minus.

Awaji: 'Instead of 65, simply playing 1 in Dia. 12 is the correct move. Connecting at 2 is

about the best that White can do. Black then hanes at 3, and the game is incredibly close.'



Dia. 12

According to Awaji's investigations, following this diagram would have made the game a half-pointer. It would almost have been just a question of luck which side won.

If White plays 2 in Dia. 12 at 'a', the ataris of Black 'b' and 'c' will affect his eye shape and his territory. When you take a good look at it, it becomes apparent that 65 is bad style.




Figure 7 (201-257)

Figure 7 (201-257)

Lee doesn't get another chance after 65 in Figure 6. In contrast to his usual poker face, he let some of his disappointment show. In a sense, his new move had been wasted if it didn't win him the game.



Reviewing the game with Takemiya (left of Lee), Otake (right of Yoda), Awaji (seated, centre), Takagi (standing behind and to the left of Awaji), and Fujisawa Kazunari (standing, extreme right behind Yoda). A vow Yoda took to shave his head if he failed to get one of the Japanese places in the Fujitsu Cup explains his hairstyle.

Yoda's win turned out to be decisive. Lee was unable to recover in the fourth game, which was his worst of the series. However, we can be sure of one thing: Yoda will have to watch out for him in the future.

White wins by 2 1/2 points.

(Igo Club, June 1991.)

In its April issue, *Igo Club* surveyed the professional careers to date of these two players.

Lee Changho

Born on 29 July 1975. Learnt go from his grandfather at the age of six, became apprenticed to a professional 6-dan at eight, won a national youth championship at nine and took 3rd place in the World Youth Championship. Became a live-in disciple of Cho Hun-hyun. Became an insei at the Korean Ki-in and made shodan at the age of 10.

1986: 8 wins 3 losses (72.7%)

1987: 44-11 (80%)

1988: 75-10 (88.2%)

1989: 84-27 (75.7%)

1990: 78-12 (86.7%)

1991: 28-6 (as of 25 May)

Total: 315-69 (82%).

As far as we can work out (our information is not complete), Lee has won the following eight titles to date.

1989

29th Top Position: beat Cho Hun-hyun.

34th Kuksoo (National Champion): beat Cho.

Great King: beat Cho.

1991

30th Top Position: Lee beat Cho.

2nd Go Saint: beat Cho.

8th Great King: beat Cho 3-1.

Myunggin (= Meijin): beat Cho 3-0.

8th Baccus: beat Yoo 4-dan 3-0.

Continued on page 47.

Schlemper's Triumph in the WAGC



Ronald Schlemper: the first Westerner to break down the Far Eastern 'barrier' at the world championship.

In his 7th appearance in the World Amateur Go Championship, Ronald Schlemper (age 30) of the Netherlands has scored his biggest triumph. His actual place, 3rd, was no higher than three years ago, but the content was quite different: this time he beat the representatives of the two countries that have dominated the WAGC, Japan and China. He tied for first place with the same 7-1 score as Imamura of Japan and Hsia of Chinese Taipei. In the 10th WAGC, Schlemper tied for 3rd place with Korea, but he lost to both Japan and China and through the luck of the draw didn't have to play Korea.

This time, in the 13th WAGC, Ronald's only loss was to the 13-year-old Hsia, a prodigy who looked like following in the footsteps of last year's winner Chang Hao. (Hsia missed out on first place when he blundered away a won game against Imamura, giving the latter his third WAGC victory.) Ronald's wins against China and Japan were significant, because this is the first time a Westerner has beaten either of these two countries. To be frank, most observers didn't expect a Westerner to do so well this century. His success demonstrates that it is not out of the question for a Westerner to win the tournament.

Below we present brief commentaries on the landmark wins.

Schlemper v. Li (Round 4)

White: Li Jiaqing 6-dan (China)

Black: Ronald Schlemper 6-dan (Netherlands)

Played on 22 May 1991.

Commentary by Okubo Ichigen 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50)

White 26. If to the right of 27, Black squeezes on the outside.

The result to 33 looks even.

White 44. Better to hold back at A. The more solid corner enclosure would make things more difficult for Black in the fighting that subsequently erupts on the left side and at the top. With 44, Black is able to exploit the thinness of the corner position.

Figure 2 (51-100)

Black 63 is risky. White 64 at 65 would be severe; after exchanging Black 67 for White 68, Black would have to play 64, but White's answer at 92 would adversely affect the top right. The result to 73 makes 63 a success.

White 80. White should force with A. White 86 should be at 91.

White 94 should be B. When White omits to play 97 with 96, Black seizes the chance to play 97.




Figure 2 (51-100)




Figure 4 (151-200)

ko: 54, 57, 60, 99




Figure 3 (101-150)

ko: 16, 19

Figure 3 (101-150)

White 12 is a desperation measure.

Black 21. Black should expand the bottom with A and aim at B.

Black 37. Black 38 would be thicker. White 38 makes the top black group thin.

White 46 is bad style. White should play 49; if Black C, then White D aims at a cut. Finding an answer would be difficult.

Linking up the black group with 47 and 49 decides the game.

Figures 4, 5

Black wins by 2 1/2 points.




Figure 5 (201-255)

ko: 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 31, 34, 37, 42, 45, 48; 52: connects (left of 2); 55: connects (right of 9)

Schlemper v. Imamura (Round 8)

White: Imamura Fumiaki 7-dan (Japan)

Black: Ronald Schlemper 6-dan (Netherlands)

Played on 24 May 1991.

When this game was played, the tournament was already decided, Imamura had enough SOS points to win even if he ended in a tie through losing the game, but he was undoubtedly keen to clinch the tournament with a perfect slate, to improve on his win in Bei-

jing in 1987, when three players ended with seven points (his first win was in the 2nd WAGC in 1980, when it was still a knockout tournament).




Figure 1 (1-47)

Figure 1 (1-47)

Black 29 is a good move. When White tries to settle himself with 30 and 32, Black 33 and 35 offer the strongest resistance. The continuation to 46 is satisfactory for Black.

Black 47 is another good move: the game is developing nicely for Black.




Figure 2 (48-100)

Figure 2 (48-100)

White's attack with 48 to 52 is unreasonable. White's three stones are cut off

and floating aimlessly after 59, giving White a tough game.

Seeing no prospect of gain from further play on the right, White switches to the left side with 70. The wall Black has built with 55 and 57 is quite a threat to White.

White is unable to seize the initiative.




Figure 3 (101-160)

Figure 3 (101-160)

A large *semeai* (capturing race) follows when White cuts at 28.




Figure 4 (161-223)

Figure 4 (161-223)

The result after 76 is a *seki* — *gote* for White, moreover. This sets the seal on victory for Black.

Black wins by 1 1/2 points.

The Myriad Techniques of Go


Sato Masaharu 9-dan

The title of this series in Japanese, 'Shinra Banjo Tekunikku', includes a clever pun on a term meaning 'the whole of creation' or 'all the things in the universe'. We haven't been able to reproduce the pun in translation, but we hope the contents of the series will be as interesting in English.

Sato's aim in this series, which appears in the 1991 *Igo Club*, is to select problems on a common theme in each instalment that are interesting and stimulating yet not out of the way or impractical. Some of the problems might take dan-level strength to solve, but as instructional material it is meant for kyu players. We hope our readers will enjoy the series.


1. Interesting ladder variations

The first instalment of this series focusses on some intriguing ladder problems.



1. Black to play.

What is the result when Black ataris at A? What happens to the ladder?




2. Black to play.

This is a familiar pattern. White 2 is an overplay. How can Black punish White? Obviously a ladder is involved.




Sato Masaharu

Born on 16 January 1947. Became a disciple of Kitani Minoru in 1959, made shodan in 1964, reached 9-dan in 1986. Played in the 6th Meijin league in 1980. Has won the Kisei 6-dan and 7-dan championships twice each.




3. Black to play.

The positions of both sides look shaky. White 2 is an aggressive answer to Black 1. This gives Black a chance to land a decisive blow.




4. Black to play.

White is trying to escape from the ladder by playing the marked stone. Because of the white stone on the vital point to the left, Black seems to be on the point of collapse. What is Black's counter?



5. Black to play.

White has just played a tricky-looking move (the marked stone). Can Black escape?




6. Black to play

White has just descended at 1. Black would like to connect at 'a', but White can get a ladder with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'. Can you find a way to get Black out of trouble?


Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. This position arises from the contact play of 1, a tactic White often resorts to in handicap games. However, White 9 and 11 are a bluff.




Dia. 1: handicap tactic




Dia. 2: not enough

Dia. 2. One counter is to set up a *geta* with 1. It's not a real *geta*, as White can capture two stones, but Black's aim is to squeeze. He cuts

off the white stone on the left side, so this is not a bad result, but ...



Dia. 3: a ladder




*Dia. 4: no escape
16: connects*

Dia. 3. When Black has the marked stone in place further up on the left side, he can atari at 3. The white stone left of 7 may seem to break the ladder, but —


Dia. 4. Black spins the ladder round with 3, then comes from the other side with 13 on. This way he captures everything.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. The problem comes up when White makes the crude move of 4 in this joseki. His aim is to capture three stones with 6 on, which is OK, but 18 is completely unreasonable.




Dia. 1: unreasonable




Dia. 2: let off the hook

Dia. 2. Answering with the unthinking moves of 1 and 3 lets White off the hook. Black has missed his opportunity.



Dia. 3: the tesuji




Dia. 4: unrelenting

Dia. 3. The placement of 1 is a sharp counter. White has no answer. If 2, Black cuts at 3. Next —


Dia. 4. All White can do is to atari at 1, but Black is unrelenting: he pushes along strongly with 4. Instead —

Dia. 5. Black 1 here would let White play 2 in sente, so White would be able to save himself with 4.




Dia. 3


3: connects



Dia. 4



Dia. 5: a mistake




Dia. 6: a loose ladder


Dia. 6. If White tries to escape with 2 after Black 1 (4 in *Dia. 4*), Black captures him in a loose ladder (that is, one with two liberties open).

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 may look like a tesuji at first sight, but when White connects at 2 he has no follow-up. Cutting at 'a' is too slow. Black has to find a better move.



Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2:

Dia. 2. Wedging in at 1 is the best counter. The counter-thrust of 3 is a tesuji. Capturing at 5 makes this result clearly favourable for Black. Instead of 4 —


Dia. 3. What if White captures at 1? Black squeezes with 2, then cuts at 4. He might seem to be in trouble after 5, but —

Dia. 4. Black gets a ladder with 1 and 3. It's a mini-version of the spiral ladder.


Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. The key to the solution is the fact that the three black stones at the bottom have three liberties. That gives Black a bit of time to play with. Black 1 here, however, makes it easy for White: it just helps the marked white stone to play a role.

Playing 1 at 2 is also useless. Black needs to upgrade his weaponry.




Dia. 1: helping White




Dia. 2: also wrong

Dia. 2. The next move that might occur to Black is 1, which he hopes is a *geta*. If 2, he uses brute force to seal White in with 3, but the attempt ends in failure when White captures a stone at 6.

Dia. 3. To make quite clear what is the problem in *Dia. 2*, here is the final shape. Black fails because he can't atari at 'a'.



Dia. 3: the problem




Dia. 4: the solution


Dia. 4. When White plays 2, Black must

simply connect at 3. This slow-looking move is actually a tesuji. White is now helpless.

Dia. 5. If White tries to escape with 4, Black gets a ladder, as he can now atari at 7.



Dia. 5: a ladder




Dia. 6: obvious


Dia. 6. If White had already made the exchange of the marked stones, then finding Black 1 would be much easier. Changing the timing as in *Dia. 4* is the blindspot.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. Pushing up with 1 just lets White get a squeeze with 2 on. White has a ladder after 6. Blunt moves like 1 rarely work.



Dia. 1: too blunt
5: connects



Dia. 2: failure

Dia. 2. Connecting at 1 first doesn't help. Black finds himself short of liberties.


Having read out these two variations in a game, most players would probably give up, but —

Dia. 3. There are other moves to look at. Unfortunately, the desperate wedge at 1 is easily refuted.


Dia. 4. Throwing in a cut at 1 is the last chance, and it turns out to be the tesuji. It may seem to have no direct connection with the stones in trouble, but it helps Black to turn the tables.

White can't answer 1 at 'a'. An atari at 'b' obviously fails, as Black 'a' will be sente. If

White 'c', Black gets a snapback with 'd'.




Dia. 3: desperate




Dia. 4: the last chance

Dia. 5. Connecting at 2 is the only move left, but now Black can move out with 3. In contrast to *Dia. 1* —




Dia. 5: Black escapes



Dia. 6: not a ladder

Dia. 6. White can't get a ladder after 3: if White 'a', Black 'b' is atari; if White 'b', the ladder runs into Black's stone. The 1—2 exchange in *Dia. 5* makes all the difference.




Dia. 1


Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. The position in the problem arises after Black's invasion at 1. The continuation to 10 is a standard pattern, after which Black tries to squeeze with 11. Instead of 16, White could capture at 'a', and the result, with Black making a low position after Black 16, would be nothing for Black to boast about. However, White plays more aggressively, refusing to let Black link up. What is Black's counter?

Dia. 2. The surprising answer is attaching at 1, which seems to be unrelated to the problem. However, this is a clever move. Its meaning —



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


Dia. 3. If White 2, Black connects at 3, and this exchange is clearly favourable for him.

Dia. 4. If White defends at 2, Black connects at 3, and White can no longer get a ladder


with 4 and 6. Black 1 is in just the right place. After 9 —

Dia. 5. Persisting with 1 gets nowhere, as 4 becomes an atari.

(*Igo Club*, January 1991. Translated by John Power.)



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Continued from page 39.

Yoda Norimoto

Born on 11 February 1966. Learnt go from his father at the age of nine, became a disciple of Ando Takeo 6-dan, made shodan at 14.

1980: 14-4 (77.8%)
 1981: 42-7-1 jigo (85%)
 1982: 41-11 (78.8%)
 1983: 40-8 (83.3%)
 1984: 29-9 (76.3%)
 1985: 26-19 (57.7%)
 1986: 37-11 (77%)
 1987: 42-11 (79.2%)
 1988: 38-13 (74.5%)
 1989: 51-15 (73.3%)
 1990: 46-19 (70.8%)
 1991: 27-19 (as of 18 Oct.)

Yoda's major accomplishments to date are winning the Shinjin-O (king of the new stars)

title five times (a record), entering the Meijin league at the age of 18 (another record), and winning the 38th NHK Cup earlier this year. He has also won the Shin'ei (new stars) TV tournament twice and the Shun'ei (young stars) TV tournament once. He has played in the Meijin league three times and the Honinbo league twice.

The *Igo Club* reporter also recalled a story he heard at Fujisawa Shuko's *kanreki* (60th birthday) celebration in 1985. Cho Hun-hyun, who had made the trip specially from Seoul to attend, mentioned that he had a promising nine-year-old pupil who could give him a close game on two stones. Being able to play a top professional on that handicap indicates that Lee was probably already of professional shodan strength. One wonders how the 11-year-old Cho Chikun (he made shodan then) would have compared with Lee at 11.

(Translated by John Power)


Efficiency (2)

by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Forcing Moves

In the first instalment of this series, we looked at concepts of efficient play in the fuseki and in josekis. In this issue we will analyse the efficiency of forcing moves. This is an important theme, because the question of playing forcing moves that are at one's disposal is always a vexed one. Play a forcing move too soon and it becomes *aji-keshi*, that is, it helps the opponent to eliminate weaknesses in his position (and may also lose ko threats); play it too late and the opponent may ignore it.


When you play a forcing move, you should first make a careful evaluation of the necessity for it or the gain you are likely to make from it. Amateur games are usually full of bad forcing moves. A couple of examples will show what I mean.



Dia. 1: *aji-keshi*

Dia. 1. Black 1 certainly forces White to answer at 2, but it can't be called a *kikashi* or forcing move. It adds very little to Black's position while helping White to strengthen himself. That makes the threat of White's cut with 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' more severe. Playing moves like 1 shows that you have no real concept of what constitutes a forcing move.

Dia. 2. They may not be as bad as Dia. 1, but Black 1 and 3 can't be called forcing moves either. Black 1 deprives Black of the option of attacking at 'a': he can no longer aim at following up with a placement at Black 2. Black also loses the options of applying pressure from the centre with moves like 'b' and 'c'.




Dia. 2: also *aji-keshi*

There is only a hair's breadth of difference between forcing moves and *aji-keshi* moves. The problem is how to distinguish them.


The effectiveness of forcing moves

I believe that forcing moves are moves that retain their effectiveness. For example —

Dia. 3. Black 1 is a forcing move, not *aji-keshi*. If omitted, then at some stage —



Dia. 3: a superb forcing move




Dia. 4: undeserved profit for White


Dia. 4. White will slide along the top with 1. If Black wants to answer, 2 is about the best move he has. White might also consider using 1 to attach at 'a', followed by Black 2, White 1.

Dia. 5. If the exchange of the marked stones

is in place, then Black 2 becomes a perfect blocking move. The question of whether or not Black can block in sente at the top makes an enormous difference to the amount of territory he can hope to make there. Even if the marked black stone is captured, it remains an effective move.




Dia. 5: Black can block



Dia. 6: a standard forcing sequence

Dia. 6. The probe of Black 1 is a technique which most players will have encountered. If White 2, Black cuts at 3 to create forcing moves at 5 and 7. This large-scale *kikashi* sequence is a joseki. However, after this —


Dia. 7. Black must not try to save his forcing stones with 1: this immediately makes his group heavy and his forcing moves cease to be forcing moves. White can now seize the initiative by attacking with 2 and 4. Black is unlikely to be captured, but the position no longer feels good for him.



Dia. 7: heavy


Dia. 8. In this kind of position, dropping back, for example, to 1, is the wisest policy. I

hope none of my readers is disturbed by the large loss Black seems to suffer when White cuts at 2. When Black plays at 3 or 'a', the result actually represents a major gain for him. If you don't believe me, look at the next diagram.




Dia. 8: a major gain

Dia. 9. Let's suppose that in this position Black has made a shoulder hit at 1. White 2, permitting Black 3, is surely a strange response. Yet this is equivalent to the result in Dia. 8 if one omits the four black and four white stones played in the forcing sequence in Dia. 6.




Dia. 9: a different perspective



Dia. 10: can't connect

Dia. 10. Dia. 8 is awful, so White will probably answer 1 by pushing down at 2. If Black 3, sliding along the top with 4 is the standard move. However, the marked stones prove useful in preventing White from linking up after 5. That demonstrates the effectiveness of these forcing moves.




Dia. 11: easier for White

Dia. 11. Without the forcing moves, White easily links up with 4. I'm not saying that the game is bad for Black, but his play is certainly a little lacking in ingenuity.


Forcing stones can be sacrificed

The skilful use of forcing stones cannot be ignored in the quest for efficiency. I stated that forcing moves are moves that retain their effectiveness, but note also that it doesn't matter if forcing stones are captured. The point is that once you have forced the opponent to answer submissively, the forcing stones have already served their purpose. For example —

Dia. 12. Black 1 is a forcing move because it forces White to answer at 2. At one stroke, Black 1 prevents White from expanding his top moyo with 'a' or 'b'. The point now is not to cling to Black 1, as it has already carried out its function.




Dia. 12: forcing move




Dia. 13: making shape in sente

Dia. 13. If White later pushes down and cuts with 1 and 3, Black should not try to hang on to the marked stone. Quietly pulling back at 4 is best. The loss of the marked stone is outweighed by the advantage of making good shape in sente. If you can understand this, then you can understand the role of forcing moves.

Dia. 14. Would White play a move at 1 in this position? Hardly, yet this is equivalent to the result in Dia. 13. White has added a stone to secure the capture of a black stone that Black could not save.



Dia. 14: 1 is slack




Dia. 15: not good enough for Black

Dia. 15. Note, however, that a different logic applies if White counters by cutting with 2 and 4 immediately. White may do this if he dislikes answering passively. If Black still pulls back at 5, White gets a good result with 6 or 'a', since he has not played the superfluous move at 1 in Dia. 14. Black cannot permit this.


Dia. 16. When White cuts immediately, Black has to be prepared to fight back with 1. An alternative is to play Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. A forcing move can be sacrificed after the opponent submits to it; otherwise you must fight.

Dia. 17. This forcing move is part of a high-level strategy. Black plays 1 when White looks like getting a large moyo. The ability to perceive when a forcing move like this is called


for is a true sign of strength. If White answers at 2, Black is in no hurry to flee at 'a'. The forcing strategy is complete when White submits at 2, so Black will be happy to sacrifice 1.



Dia. 16: a time to fight




Dia. 17: a high-level forcing move



Dia. 18: not worried

Dia. 18. Let's imagine, to take an extreme case, that White captures the stone with successive moves (the marked stones). This is nothing to worry about.




Dia. 19: no gain, no loss

Dia. 19. If Black were to play 1 in this position, would White answer at 2? In Dia. 18, this is, in effect, what he has done. Losing Black 1 without White 2 on the board would be unbearable for Black, but here he has nothing to


get upset about.

The situation in Dias. 18 and 19 is admittedly unrealistic, but we hope it serves to make our point. Once a forcing move has been answered on the inside (that is, away from the centre), then it is light and can be discarded. Let's look at a more realistic example.



Dia. 20: too heavy

Dia. 20. When Black switches elsewhere after Dia. 17, White is most likely to attack with 1. Black may feel tempted to escape with 2 and 4, but this approach earns a failing grade. White connects solidly at 5 and while he is building useful centre thickness Black is fleeing ignominiously. There is also the possibility that White may try to capture him immediately by pushing along at 'a' instead of 5. The lesson is that there is no need to respond directly to an attack on a forcing stone.



Dia. 21: playing lightly

Dia. 21. Lightly skipping to 2 is much more interesting. Black can forget about his marked stone once White has answered with his marked stone. If White continues with 'a', his efforts to capture the marked black stone will just be a source of amusement to Black.


However, as stated earlier, things are different if the opponent does not answer submissively. For example —

Dia. 22. If White counterattacks with 2, Black can definitely not afford to give up his stone at 1. When White chooses to fight, Black

has to match his aggression. He shows his fighting spirit by plunging in at 3. There is no way of predicting how this fight will turn out, but it is unlikely that Black's stones will be captured. More likely, he'll live big inside White's territory.

Playing forcing moves in the context of a whole-board position is, of course, more difficult than in the local positions we have shown. However, we hope this article will help you to develop your own judgement.

(Let's Go, May 1988)



Dia. 22: must fight


My Secret Strategies for Handicap Games

Ogoshi Ichiro 6-dan


In this article Ogoshi 6-dan shows us two strategies he uses to confuse opponents in four-stone handicap games. He also shows the best counters, so you might like to try these trick moves out on opponents who don't read this magazine.

Dia. 1. White 1 makes *miai* of linking up with 'a' and attaching at 3. Black 2 would probably be the automatic response of many players, but when White plays 3 he takes a lot of corner profit. Black is very dissatisfied.


1. Submarine Attack I



White 1 is a submarine attack I employ occasionally. Since it's on the second line, Black is not in immediate danger of having his group destroyed if he goes wrong, but he may be robbed of his base. To find the right answer to 1, you first have to establish what White is after.



Dia. 1: profit for White




Dia. 2: a target for attack


Dia. 2. Black 1 stops White from linking up on either side, but White lives in the corner in sente. When he extends at 12, the whole black group is thin: it provides a nice target for

White to attack. Creating a weak group like this lets White seize the initiative in a handicap game.

Dia. 3. Black 1 is also a popular answer. Its virtue is that it is safe, but White is satisfied when he links up with 2. Black can later capture a stone with 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', but his shape is not very good.




Dia. 3: safe but . . .



Dia. 4: simplest

Dia. 4. Attaching at 1 is the simplest answer. After 5, 'a' and 'b' are *miai* for Black. Black 1 follows one of the principles of local fights: when you want to attack a stone, first build strength by attacking another stone. There is no need to answer the marked white stone directly.




Dia. 5: satisfactory

Dia. 5. Next, White 1 is the only move: letting Black cut off his marked stone with 'a' would be awful. Capturing a stone with 2 and 4 is then good enough. This result is favourable for Black.


White won't use 3 to atari 2, as that way he takes gote. Note that as before Black can aim at cutting off a stone later with Black 'a' through 'e'.

The conclusion is that Black 1 in Dia. 4 is the move that will please White least.




Dia. 6: variation

Dia. 6. White may try 1 instead. This is not quite the same as the previous move. Answering with Black 2 or Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c' is not really satisfactory. Compared to Dias. 3 and 5, White 1 is in a superior position.



Dia. 7: submissive

Dia. 7. Black may feel tempted to play at 2, but this is just what White is waiting for. Up to 7, he forces Black to answer submissively both at the top and on the side. Note that if Black uses 4 to hane at 5, White's cut at 4 will be troublesome.




Dia. 8: stabilized

Dia. 8. Attaching at 2 is the best counter. White has no choice but to pull back with 3 and 5, so Black secures a solid base with 6 and 7.


8. That gives him a good result. White is left with a thin position and he hasn't made any profit.

2. Submarine Attack II




At first sight, White 1 looks like a bluff, a 'fake' move, but it can cause Black a lot of trouble if he makes the wrong answer.

Dia. 1. The standard approach for White is to play 1 and 3. This is correct, but it is not interesting for White: instead of answering at 'a' (which would give White the peep at 'b' to look forward to), Black will move out with 4 or 'c'. That's why White decides to try the tricky placement.




Dia. 1: standard



Dia. 2: White on top


Dia. 2. If Black answers submissively with 2, White links up with 3 and 5. This is what White was hoping for: he has gouged out the corner territory and taken away Black's eye shape.

After this result, Black will hardly have the courage to make a pincer at the top, yet if he moves out with a move like 'a', White gains territory with 'b' while Black is still unsettled. White has clearly taken the initiative.



Dia. 3: too good for White


Dia. 3. Answering at 2 is even more uninspired. It may stop White from linking up, but White lives in sente in the corner. When he switches to 9, he has a severe attack underway. This result is too good for White.




Dia. 4: safe but ...

Dia. 4. In this kind of position Black 1 is the *honte* (proper move). If White 2, blocking at 3 is safe, but White is satisfied, as he is left with a nice forcing move at 'a'. On the other hand, it is hard for Black to find a good move to defend the corner if he wants to do so. This variation seems slightly advantageous for White.

Dia. 5. Black may feel tempted to block at 3 to stop White from linking up. This is a stronger move than 3 in Dia. 4. White naturally seeks life in the corner with 4 and 6. Letting him link up with 'a' next would be slack, so —




Dia. 5: a strong counter



Dia. 6: a tough fight


Dia. 6. Black may block at 1, but then he must be prepared to fight after White cuts with 2 and 4. White has to come back to make eye shape with 8, so Black attaches at 'a'. A very difficult fight follows. This fight is feasible for Black, but he may find looking after two groups in a handicap game a lot of trouble. For that reason I can't recommend this variation.

Dia. 7. Ramming into White with 4 is the best move. This stops White from connecting up much more efficiently than in Dia. 5. Once again White has no choice but to live with 5 and 7, after which —



Dia. 7: the best counter

Dia. 8. Black plays the sente moves from 1 to 5, then makes a pincer at 7. The continuation shown here is just one of many possibilities, of course, but whatever happens Black should be able to seize the initiative if he discovers the counter of 4 in Dia. 7.



Dia. 8: Black is doing well

In both the submarine attacks we have shown, White's aim is to take away Black's base and force him to flee into the centre. Black's task is to discover what White's real aim is, making it easier for him to take steps to foil him.

(Kido, December 1987)

The 3-3 Point Modern Opening Strategy

by Cho Chikun
World Champion & Honinbo

This book analyses the role of the 3-3 point in opening strategy. Both local and whole-board examples are included from about 100 of Cho's games. Written in an easy and intuitive style for kyu players, but also valuable for players of dan strength.

Order from Ishi Press International
USA: \$12.95 + \$1.50 shipping/handling
U.K. & Europe: £8.95 + £1 s/h (inc. VAT)

ISBN4-87187-044-8

VISA, Mastercard, Access orders welcome.

4th Mingren League Title-holder: Ma Xiaochun

Player	N	Y	Q	W	L	Li	C	C	Score
Nie Weiping 9D	—	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6 — 1
Yu Bin 9D	1	—	0	1	1	1	1	1	6 — 1
Qian Yuping 9D	0	1	—	1	0	1	1	1	5 — 2
Wu Zhaoyi 7D	0	0	0	—	1	1	1	1	4 — 3
Liu Xiaoguang 9D	0	0	1	1	—	0	1	0	3 — 4
Li Yuchuan 2D	0	0	0	0	1	—	1	1	3 — 4
Chen Zude 9D	0	0	0	0	0	0	—	1	1 — 6
Che Zewu 7D	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	—	1 — 6

4th Mingren Title: Ma Rebuffs Nie's Challenge

Although he has not starred on the international scene this year, Nie Weiping has been having one of his best years in internal Chinese tournaments for some time — at least until he ran into Ma Xiaochun in the Mingren title match. He had won the Qiwang (king of go) title by defeating Qian Yuping 9-dan 3–1, taken the Tianyuan title from Liu with three straight wins, then defeated Yu Bin in a playoff to decide the challenger for the Mingren title. Nie had ended in a tie with Yu Bin, the only player to whom he lost, in the eight-man Mingren league.

In the title match, Nie came close, but in the decisive game, played on 28 October, Ma defeated him to retain his title 3–2. He has now held this title for three years in a row.

Yu Bin Become China's 10th 9-dan

Yu Bin, aged 24, has become China's 10th 9-dan, thanks to good results in this year's promotion tournament, held in June. There are also four new 8-dans: Zhang Wendong, Yang Hui, Liao Guiyong, and Wang Jianhong.

News from Europe

Shirae Sets Simultaneous Record in Paris

As reported in GW63 (page 64), Shirae Haruhiko 7-dan set a world record last year by playing 101 opponents simultaneously in the centre of the Ginza shopping area in Tokyo. This year he extended the record, taking on 102 opponents from over 20 countries in the

Palace Chaillot square in front of the Eiffel Tower. The 'go marathon', as it was billed locally, was held on 27 July, the day before the European Go congress started in Belgium, to help ensure a good roll-up. The strength of the participants ranged from dan level to 15-kyu, and 20% were women.

Like the Ginza exhibition, after playing by himself for one hour Shirae enlisted the help of other players (including his daughter) to finish the games off, so it was possible to conclude the simultaneous in three hours. The simultaneous was held right in the middle of the busiest tourist area in Paris and attracted a lot of attention.

Continued from page 64.

5. *Quan Tang Shi* (Complete Tang Poems), Vol. 521.

6. The same event is mentioned in the *Nan Shi* biography of Lu Xiaohui, and the *Chen Shu* (History of the Chen Dynasty).

7. Preserved in the *Shuo Fu* (Sayings Outside the City Walls). It should be noted that some historians place Handan Chun in a later Wei period, 451–534.

8. The Great Appendix, Section II, Chapter V.

9. Book 2, Part I.

10. Book XVI/9.

The Many Faces of Go isn't just another pretty face...



The Many Faces of Go is pretty. You'll particularly enjoy the VGA graphics of clamshell and slate stones on a kaya board. But, more than *just* pretty, The Many Faces of Go is the most comprehensive computer Go product ever produced.

In addition to a computer opponent who can challenge a wide range of players—The Many Faces of Go includes an upgrade of the COSMOS program, at least 2 stones stronger than before—you will find:

- A complete **on-line tutorial** for beginning players. Combined with the program's hints and instructional comments, a new player will find all the advice and support he or she needs to get started with Go.
- A **game viewing program** that allows you to review recorded games, including comments and annotations. This is compatible with GoScribe, Go World on Disk, and other game collections we publish.
- A **problem presenter** (over 200 problems included). Work out the solution in a free play mode, then have the program verify your answer or show you the refutation.
- A **joseki tutor** that will help you study corner variations. Use the tutor by itself or interrupt a game to check out possible joseki. Over 20,000 moves on file!
- A 44-page **manual** explaining how to use The Many Faces of Go and including background about Go and the program.

Whether you are just learning Go, or an expert player, you will find The Many Faces of Go both entertaining and instructive. For IBM PC or compatible with at least 512K RAM. Supports VGA, EGA, CGA, Hercules, and Tandy graphics.

Send your order to Ishi Press International, 76 Bonaventura Drive, San Jose, CA 95134, U.S.A. Please enclose a check in U.S. funds drawn on a U.S. bank or postal money order for \$59.95. California residents please include 7% sales tax. Please add shipping as follows: U.S. \$3, Canada or international surface \$3.35, international air \$11. We can also accept Mastercard or VISA (be sure to include the expiration date). Telephone (408) 944-9900 or FAX (408) 944-9110.

Go Grades and Early Masters

by John Fairbairn

A 4th-century Chinese generalissimo, Wang Dun, was once asked by the power broker Yu Liang who were his four best friends. Wang listed them, but not in order. So Yu persisted: 'Who is at the head of the list?'

Wang replied: 'Naturally there is someone.'

Yu asked again: 'Who is it?'

Wang said, 'Well, of course, people have their own opinions as to who it is.'

At this point one of Yu's attendants stepped on his foot, and so he finally gave up with his questions.¹

Clearly it is just as futile to ask who heads the list of great go players, but Yu's curiosity is an emotion we all share — certainly I do, and being sans attendant I have been indulging myself by researching the lives of the early Chinese masters.

In a sense it is a barren exercise because few details and none of their games remain, so that it is impossible to make any comparisons. But one fascinating by-product was the discovery that our go grades go back nearly 2,000 years (and mine seems to have been stuck at its present level that long!).

Chronologically the head of the list is easy to pinpoint, for the first named player in the literature is Yi Qiu, or Qiu the go player. He is quoted by Mencius in the 4th century BC in a parable² on the benefit of serious study in which Mencius said: 'In the state of Qi, among those who play the game, Yi Qiu is considered the best.' The parable concerns Qiu teaching two men, one paying proper attention and one not. This obviously implies he was known to be a go teacher, and perhaps made his living thus.

We know nothing more about him, but a tradition evolved in which he was regarded as the first Go Sage. The phrase first appears in the *Bao Pu Zi* (The Book of Master Baopu) by Ge Hong (284–364) where it is said: 'A person who has no equal at go is called a Go Sage. Therefore at present Yan Ziqing and Ma Suiming have this appellation of Go Sage.' We know nothing about these players, though they were obviously contemporaneous with

Ge; this makes it possible that Ma was the Ma Lang of the Jin Dynasty (265–420) referred to in the Record of Books and Classics part of the *Sui Shu* (History of the Sui Dynasty, 589–618) as having compiled 29 volumes of 'Go Positions', which could imply that he was a serious go player and not simply some high official being flattered.

Ge is unlikely to have invented the phrase Go Sage, but the fact he is reporting it suggests it was recent. We have reasons to think go suddenly became extremely popular around this time (perhaps because of the putative introduction of the 19x19 board) and that the level of expertise accordingly shot up. It seems fair to infer also that Go Sage was the only such designation in use, and so grades had not yet been formalised. If the 19x19 boards had only just come into use, it is unlikely too that a handicap system existed yet, especially as the previous 17x17 boards almost certainly had an initial arrangement like that of the modern Tibetan game with very many stones already on the board.³

In another work, *Xi Jing Za Ji* (Jottings from the Western Capital), Ge Hong refers to another leading player who was earlier than Yen and Ma: 'Du Fuzi of Duling was good at go and was foremost in the whole empire. People sometimes mocked at the way he spent his days, but Du said: "Refining principles is sufficient to benefit greatly (my understanding of Confucius) the Sage's teachings."'

Significantly he did not describe Du as a Go Sage, although that appellation has been granted to him since. We do not actually know when Du lived, but since the *Xi Jing Za Ji* is a book of anecdotes of the Han period (i.e. before 220 AD) he may belong to that period. Some would place him in the subsequent Wei period, however, especially those tempted to conclude he was the famous Du Yu, a scholar who wrote a commentary to the *Zuo Zhuan*. It was he who said in his commentary that *yi*, the term used in *Zuo Zhuan*, is *weiqi*.

With the next Go Sage there is a significant change. He was Jiang Bin, a senior official of

the Eastern Jin dynasty, who died around 370. The contemporary reference to him is not as Go Sage (that is again a later appellation) but as of 'the first rank in go'. Fan Wang (c. 308–372) said in his *Qi Pin* (Go Grades) that Jiang Bin and Wang Tian, son of the Chancellor Wang Dao, tied for first class while Wang Dao himself was of the fifth class.

This is the first mention of players being graded. The clear inference from the references just quoted is that grading probably evolved in the mid-4th century, and it is generally assumed that it was modelled on a civil service grading structure which evolved in the Wei period (220–265). We shall see later why this assumption ought to be valid.

First, however, it is worth pointing out that we have quite a few biographical details of both Jiang and Wang Tian, because of their important part in the politics of the time, and in Jiang's case we even have a go anecdote. The *Shi Shuo Xin Yu* (A New Account of Tales of the World) by Liu Yiqing (403–444) tells us: 'When Jiang Bin, the Vice Director of the Imperial Secretariat, was young, Chancellor Wang Dao once invited him to play a game of go with him. Wang's skill was inferior by about two stones, but he wanted to play an even game as an experiment, in order to observe him. Jiang did not immediately put down any pieces, and Wang asked, "Why don't you move?" Jiang said: "I'm afraid it won't do this way." One of the bystanders said, "This young man's game is not bad." Wang slowly raised his hands and said, "This young man excels not just in go."'

At this remove in time it is not entirely clear what the precise point of the anecdote is, but it is included in a section of *Tales of the World* meant to illustrate 'proper' behaviour. What is clear is that not only do we have a grading system, but it was accompanied by a handicapping system that sounds just like the modern one — and the law of historical continuity makes this a fair assumption.

Although we have no games to judge these players by, it should be obvious that the development of a handicap system using extra stones is far from being a trivial achievement.

We also have another important clue to the level of early go. In a long go poem, *Weiqi Fu*, the scholar Ma Rong (?–166 AD) described a game of go using several technical terms. That

alone indicates that go had reached a certain level of sophistication, but I think it is his depiction of the ebb and flow of a typical game that best illustrates a high standard of go at the time. I must say, too, that I find it eerie the way Ma's lines, despite the span of almost two millennia, describe my own games:

*But if you are too greedy to capture his stones,
He will break down your walls,
And when the dyke bursts it will not be stopped
But will overflow and the flood reach far and wide.*

After Jiang Bin's time references to go grades are fairly frequent. This is partly due to the way histories of the time were written — in the form of a series of biographies. If a person was good at go this was deemed worthy of mention. Obviously this means the references are nearly always to the highest grades. I know of no reference to a 9th grade and (as I recall) the lowest is one to the 6th grade.

To give a couple of examples, the *Song Shu* (History of the Song Dynasty, 420–479), under the biography of the official Yang Xuanbao, says: 'He entered service as Gentleman Attendant at the Palace Gate. He was good at go and of the 3rd class in go. The Emperor [Wen Di, r. 424–454] once played him with a Commandery as the stake. Yang won and so was appointed Governor of Xuancheng.'

In the succeeding Qi dynasty (479–502), the Emperor Gao Di (i.e. Xiao Daocheng, r. 479–482) is described in the *Chronicle of Gao Di* in the *Nan Qi Shu* (History of the Southern Qi Dynasty) as of the 2nd grade. Incidentally, the same work has an interesting story about his fifth son, Hua, who had an impoverished youth. He had no paper but learned to write by tracing characters in the air with his finger. He had no go board and stones, but he cut reeds and wove them into a board. Instead of stones he pointed with his fingers, and so developed his skill that he eventually became a famous player.

The formalisation of go grades had around this time taken a remarkable, though temporary, turn under the Song Emperor Ming Di (r. 465–472). The *Nan Shi* (History of the Southern Dynasties), in the *Biography of Wang Chen*, says: 'The Emperor Ming Di loved go

(*weiqi*) and set up a Weiqi Regional District (*zhouyi*). He made Liu Xiuren, Prince of Jian'an, the Senior Rectifier of the Weiqi Regional District, and made four people — Chen, along with Shen Bo, the Heir Apparent's Commandant of the Right, Yu Guizhi, Secretarial Court Gentleman of the Bureau of Waterways and Irrigation, and Wang Kang, Vice Magistrate of Pengcheng — Junior Rectifiers. Chu Sizhuang and Fu Chuzhi, Audience Attendants, were made Enumerator-Inquirers (*qingding fangwen*).'

These titles are clearly meant to accord with regular administrative titles of the time, although the term *qingding fangwen* is not otherwise attested and the normal unit of administration would be a region — *zhouyi* is something of a nonsense word. The interesting thing, however, is that in real life the job of the Rectifiers was to keep a register of people suitable for official appointments and to grade them into nine ranks.

Xiao Ze (r. 482–494) of the following Qi dynasty, was another Emperor with an inordinate passion for go, as the *Nan Qi Shu* tells us, under the biography of Yu Yuan. It says: 'The Wu Emperor (Xiao Ze) loved go but was rather weak, and his grade was such that he had to take seven or eight stones. But out of respect he was allowed the 3rd grade. He would play for stakes with Wang Kang, who was of the 1st Grade, at this grade. Wang always offered help: "If Your Majesty were to play a knight's move here, I could not cut." The Emperor did not realise how much he was being helped and believed his skill was considerable, and so he gradually came to love go more and more.'

This mention of Wang Kang brings us to the next player after Jiang Bin to be regarded as a Go Sage. There are many references to his being the best player in the Southern Dynasties (of which Qi was part). But he had serious rivals, particularly Chu Sizhuang. In the biography of Xiao Huiji in the *Nan Qi Shu* there is mention of a game between these two before the Emperor Gao Di: 'Of the people at that time who were good go players, Wang Kang of Langya was of the 1st rank, and Chu Sizhuang of the Commandery of Wu and Xia Chisong of Huiji were both of the 2nd rank. Chisong thought quickly and was good on the

large scale, while Sizhuang thought slowly and was skilful in fighting between groups. In the Yongming era (483–494), the Wu Emperor ordered Wang Kang to give grades for go, and the Prince of Jingling, Xiao Zilang, had Xiao Huiji supervise the affairs.'

There are two special points of interest here. One is the first ever reference to go styles. It appears to have attracted attention very early and resurfaces in slightly different guises in other books. The *Suzhou-fu Zhi* (Annals of the Prefecture of Suzhou) says that: 'Chu Sizhuang was a native of the Commandery (of Wu). He made a reputation by being good at go. Wang Kang of Langya and Sizhuang were foremost and Xia Chisong was next. Xia Chisong thought quickly and was good on the large scale, while Sizhuang thought slowly and was skilful in fighting between groups.' The *Shaoxing-fu Zhi* (Annals of the Prefecture of Shaoxing) says: 'Xia Chisong was a native of Huiji. The Emperor Wen Di loved go. Of the people at that time in Jiangzuo (modern Jiangsu) who were good go players, Wang Kang of Langya was of the 1st rank, and Chu Sizhuang of the Commandery of Wu and Chisong were of the 2nd rank. Chisong thought quickly and was good on the large scale, while Sizhuang thought slowly and was skilful in fighting between groups. It is also said that whereas Wang Kang was inspired and fast, Sizhuang was skilful but slow, and whereas Kang played for influence, Chisong fought over each stone.'

The second feature to note is the mention of a grading exercise. This too appears differently in the *Suzhou-fu Zhi*. This version is: 'At the time of the Song Emperor Wen Di, Yang Xuanbao [the person mentioned above] was Governor of Huiji. The Emperor despatched Chu Sizhuang to the east to play go with Xuanbao in order to make records of the games, bring them back and replay them in front of the Emperor. The Qi Emperor Gao Di also had Sizhuang play go with Wang Kang. The game continued from around 8 a.m. to sunset but the Emperor grew weary and sent them back to the officials' part of the palace. The game was decided only in the fifth watch (around 4 a.m.). Wang Kang fell asleep after the game but Sizhuang did not go to bed until dawn. Both players were appointed as Palace

Stewards (implying they were fit to be companions of the Emperor). Some said that the reason Sizhuang reached a high grade was connected with the way he thought so deeply. No one could match him in this.'

Actually neither Wang nor Chu may have been the best players of their age. There is a record in the *Wei Shu* (History of Northern Wei), in the *Biography of Jiang Shaoyou*, which says: 'Fan Ning'er was good at go. At the time of (the Northern Wei Emperor) Xiao Wen, he once accompanied envoy Li Biao to (Southern) Qi. The Qi (Emperor, Xiao Ze) ordered the champion of Jiangnan, Wang Kang, to play a game with him. Ning'er overcame him and returned.' Judging by his name, Fan Ning'er would have been a 'barbarian' Tartar, not a Chinese, and so this would be the first international match on record.

A further point of great interest in the references to Wang Kang is the mention of recording games, which seems (here and in other stories) to be the basis of the grading exercise rather than tournament play, or belonging to a school as under the Japanese system.

None of these games remain, so a good deal of speculation is required to try to visualise what was going on. The first point to consider is how games were recorded. The earliest surviving game records date from the early 12th century in the anthology *Wang You Qing Le Ji* (Collection of Carefree and Innocent Pleasures), compiled from the Imperial Library by Li Yimin. First, they are in a form we would all recognise — numbered moves marked on the intersections of a full-board diagram — except of course that the numbers are in Chinese. Second, it was the practice then, as it remained to this century, to put all the moves on the same diagram, which made playing over a game a test of eyesight and stamina. Third, the book is an anthology of much earlier sources, and the oldest game diagram is reputed to be the opening of a game between Sun Ce and Lü Fan. Sun Ce was the ruler of the kingdom of Wu and Lü Fan one of his ministers. The game is put at 196 AD.

However, there have long been doubts about the authenticity of this record, mainly because it shows a 19x19 board and other sources of the time indicated that 17x17 boards were in use at the time. Nevertheless, that is

not a particularly good reason to reject it. As I have indicated in passing above, go suddenly became enormously popular shortly after this time, and one plausible reason may have been the introduction of a 19x19 board. Indeed, it may have been Sun Ce who introduced it — he was known as an avid go player — and this record may have been preserved in that connection. (For a fuller discussion, see the work by Li Songfu⁴, to which I would add the observation that a plausible reason for the survival into Tang times of the 17x17 boards would be that they were used by women.)

It is a little bit of a digression, but there is an interesting sidelight that shows how, as more evidence becomes available, the likelihood of the genuineness of this record increases.

There is a 'Poem after repeated farewells'⁵ by the famous Tang poet Du Mu (803–852) which runs:

There are few in the world with consummate skill like you;

There are none among us with too little to do like me.

After we part, at the bamboo window on nights of wind and snow,

In the light and shadow of a lone lantern I shall play over the Games of Wu.

We can infer from another poem by Du Mu, and the reference to consummate skill, that he is seeing off his friend and go champion of the period, Wang Feng. For those unfamiliar with Chinese poetry it should be pointed out that partings are a recurrent theme and were considered painful. The 'repeated farewells' of the title is meant to imply deep friendship. The farewell is made more subtly poignant by the unspoken fact that a game of go requires two people, and this is reinforced by the reference to a solitary lantern.

'Light and shadow' hints at the black and white of the go pieces, while the wind suggests autumn and the snow winter, implying a long separation, which saddens the poet even more. But he will divert himself by playing over the Games of Wu, which is clearly a polite way of saying playing over his games with his friend. He is paying his friend a compliment

by likening his games to an old classic.

Now this reference to the Games of Wu (literally Wu Diagrams) was the only occurrence of the phrase over the past 2000 years until the recent discovery of the long and only partially defective go classic *Dunhuang Xieben Qijing*. I have yet to make myself properly familiar with this, but it appears to be dated to the Northern Zhou period (557–581), and I imagine it is yet another treasure from the Dunhuang Caves in Gansu Province which were first excavated by Aurel Stein in 1899. At any rate, the meaning of the phrase Wu Diagrams was previously unknown. But the *Dunhuang Classic* mentions it in the phrase: 'The Wu Diagrams, 24 boards (*pan*)'. It also mentions 'Han dynasty diagrams, 113 positions (*shi*)'. The poem by Du Mu implies that the Wu Diagrams were games rather than just openings or problems, and the *Dunhuang Classic* uses a word, *pan*, that means 'board'. The more general word *shi* (position) is used in very many titles and since the books are no longer extant we cannot say what they contained. For example, there was the *Weiqi Shi* (Weiqi Positions) in 29 volumes compiled by Ma Lang, mentioned above. (We know about these books, incidentally, because they are listed in bibliographies such as the *Sui Shu, Jing Ji Zhi* (History of the Sui Dynasty, Record of Classics and Books) and the *Jiu Tang Shu, Jing Ji Zhi* (Old History of the Tang Dynasty, Record of Classics and Books). Their large number is further evidence of the popularity of go at the time.)

We do know that at least some of the books were connected with grading, because their titles tell us so. For example there was: the *Tianjian Qi Pin* (Go grades of the Tianjian era (502–519)) by Liu Yun; the *Qi Jiu Pin Xu Lu* (Record of ordering of the 9 grades of go) by Fan Wang; the *Qi Hou Jiu Pin Xu* (Further ordering of the 9 grades of go), by Yuan Zun; and the *Weiqi Pin* (Go grades) by the Liang Emperor Wu Di.

We can cull some idea as to how these gradings were carried out from anecdotes in the dynastic histories.

For example, the Liang Dynasty, which had its golden age in the first half of the 6th century AD, under the Wu Emperor Xiao Yan (r. 502–549), was an important phase in go. Xiao

Yan was famous for his efforts to encourage learning by setting up a national university in the capital, and he himself was well versed in Confucianism, Buddhism and metaphysics. He produced many works and had the habit sometimes of lecturing on the classics.

He was also addicted to go and many stories about this remain. It is said he often played go throughout the night, and not many could keep company with him to the end. Chen Qingzhi was one of them. The *Liang Shu* (History of the Liang Dynasty, 502–557), in the biography of Chen Qingzhi, records that from childhood he followed the Emperor and accompanied him throughout the night playing go without difficulty. The Emperor was very pleased with him. One of the important legacies Xiao Yan left to the go world was a magnificent and beautiful poem, the *Weiqi Fu* (Rhapsody on Go). He was also recorded as demanding the revision of go grades by Imperial decree.

In the *Nan Shi* (History of the Southern Dynasties), under the biography of Lu Qiong, it says: '(Lu Yun's son) Qiong . . . when young was a quick learner and logical. At the age of six he could make up 5-syllable poems. . . . At the end of the Datong period (535–545) Lord Lu Yun received a summons from the Emperor Xiao Yan to scrutinise and determine go grades. He gathered together Dao Gai and Zhu Yi and others. Qiong at the time was 8. He replayed the games in front of the guests. Because of this he was described throughout the city as a prodigy. Zhu Yi told (the Emperor) this, and Lu Qiong was summoned. (The Emperor) carefully assessed his manner and deportment and his cleverness and alertness, and considered him very unusual.'⁶

We do not know exactly what was meant by 'scrutinise and determine', but there was a similar occasion under the same Emperor, which suggests it involved a panel of wise men playing over (scrutinising) game records and setting grades on that basis. The *Liang Shu*, in the biography of Liu Yun (we must be careful not to confuse Liu Yun and Lu Yun), says: '(Liu) Yun was good at go [another record says he was of the 2nd grade], and the Emperor was always summoning him to attend him. He also ordered him to determine grades from game records (*qipu*) and order

them by merit.' The *Nan Shi*, in the biography of Liu Yuanjing, also tells us: 'The Liang Emperor Wu Di (Xiao Yan) loved to play go. He had Liu Yun determine grades from game records. Those raised in rank numbered 278. They were put in order of merit and the go grades were made into three divisions.'

This was patently a major exercise and may even have been a tournament. Given the examiners' difficulties in reading through the game scores, it occurs to me that we may have here an explanation, other than just remarking on feats of memory, for the common references to some individuals' ability to play back games from memory. Lu Qiong above was one case in point.

The examiner Dao Gai mentioned above was another. As a go player he was a constant companion of the Emperor Xiao Yan in playing go all night. His biography in the *Nan Shi* describes his go strength as of the 6th class, but his memory was very good. There was one occasion when Dao Gai was before the Emperor, and he was playing with Zhu Yi and others who were the best go players of the time. After the games, Dao replayed them without making a single mistake. As a result he received special appreciation from the Emperor.

Recall too that I mentioned earlier the case when the Emperor Xiao Ze despatched Chu Sizhuang to play games with Yang Xuanbao and to play them over before him on his return. I can easily imagine that people like Dao Gai, who could be used as *répétiteurs*, were worth their weight in gold on such occasions.

That then outlines the beginnings of the grading system. It remained largely the same thereafter in China until modern times. There were new features of course. In Tang times, just after the period we covered, the court evolved a system of official go players, or Expectant Officials of the Hanlin Academy. Much later, top players had to rely on private patronage and the normal way of referring to the supreme champion was *guo shou* or 'national expert'. Players below him were then usually referred to as '2 stones to a *guo shou*' and so on. Nevertheless, the traditional nine-grade structure underpinned this.

One reason for saying this is the abiding

popularity (intellectual rather than practical) of a text which first appears in the Wei period (220–265). It is in the 'Go grades' section of the *Yi Jing* by Handan Chun⁷ and runs as follows: 'There are nine grades: 1 is entering into the spirit; 2 is basking in illumination; 3 is having all the aspects; 4 is well versed in the deep and remote; 5 is practising knowledge; 6 is petty tricks; 7 is fights with bodily strength; 8 is seemingly foolish; 9 is content with being unskilful.'

I will explain the fuller meaning of these in a moment, but I am sure we can all identify ourselves somewhere on this scale. Indeed, I have read that the Kansai Ki-in still uses this scale though I do not know exactly how — perhaps on the flowery words in dan diplomas? The famous *Qi Jing Shi San Pian* (Go Classic in 13 Chapters) preserved in the *Wang You Qing Le Ji* also devotes a chapter to it, and it attracted the attention of later scholars such as the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) author Xu Zhongye. He gave an interpretation of these grades in his *Shishi Xianji*, which provides valuable extra information on the handicap system. He said: '1 is entering into the spirit; this means "fathomlessly changing, capable of knowing in advance, with purity and righteousness he enters the spiritual dimension, without fighting he causes others to submit, he is without peer." This counts as the highest of the top ranks. 2 is basking in illumination; this means "a grade 1 gives him first move in two out of three games, without effort he hits the target, without thinking he makes gains" and he has the ability to make intuitively good responses. This counts as the middle of the top ranks. 3 is having all the aspects; this means "a grade 1 gives first move, and when observing a game, if he makes shape he understands, and he has all the aspects of entering the spirit, though in miniature." This counts as the lowest of the top ranks. 4 is well versed in the deep and remote; this means "he alternately receives first move or two stones from the highest players. When observing a game, if he sees a shape is blocked he can skilfully answer and so change things, either fighting or not, and his ideas are deep and remote." This counts as the highest of the middle ranks. 5 is practising knowledge; this means "he receives a handicap of three stones.

He is not yet well versed in the principles of the deep and remote, but if he fights he uses his knowledge to achieve success." This counts as the middle of the middle ranks. 6 is petty tricks; this means "he receives four stones handicap. He does not strive for far-reaching plans but performs petty tricks." This counts as the lowest of the middle ranks. 7 is fights with bodily strength; this means "he receives five stones handicap. Whenever he moves he is bound to fight. He struggles with his opponent. He does not use his knowledge but resorts to fighting strength." This counts as the highest of the lowest ranks.

The *Shishi Xianji* does not explain the middle and lowest of the lowest ranks and of course the names of all of the grades need further commentary for a western audience.

The highest grade, *ru shen*, 'entering the spirit' is an allusion to the *Book of Changes*⁸: 'When we minutely investigate the nature and reason of things till we have entered into the inscrutable and spirit-like in them, we attain to the largest practical application of them; when that application becomes the quickest and readiest, and all personal restfulness is secured, our virtue is thereby exalted.' (tr. Legge)

The phrase has acquired rich overtones for the Chinese. The influence of Zen Buddhism gave it the connotation of a calm, contemplative state of mind in which one's own personality is not asserted. In the Zen poetry of Yan Yu, for example, it is the ultimate excellence of poetry and means entering through one's imagination into the life of things, embodying their essence or spirit. A suitable accolade for a 9-dan!

The second grade, *zuo zhao*, or 'basking in illumination' has, as far as I know, no special allusions, but 'illumination' also means 'knowledge' here, just as it does in English.

The third grade, *ju ti*, 'having all the aspects' is a reference to Mencius⁹: 'Zi Xia, Zi You and Zi Zhang each had one aspect of the Sage (Confucius). Ran Niu, the disciple Min and Yan Yuan each had all the aspects, though in miniature.'

The fourth grade, *tong you*, or 'well versed in (the principles of) the deep and remote' appears in various old texts, such as the *Wei Zhi* (Records of Wei). The only special association seems to be with the turtle (nicknamed Dr.

'Tongyou').

The fifth grade, *yong zhi*, or '(capable of) practising knowledge' has no special distinction that I know of, though it was used as a pen-name by Chen Yongzhi of the Song dynasty.

The sixth grade, *xiao qiao*, or '(performs) petty tricks' is another phrase occurring many times in old texts, such as the *Wu Zhi* (Records of Wu) and so has no specific allusion.

The seventh grade, *dou li*, 'fights with bodily strength', has a derogatory nuance because it is from the *Shi Ji*, *Xiang Yu Ji* (The Records of the Historian, Chronicle of Xiang Yu): 'I would rather fight with my brain than fight with brawn'.

The eighth grade, *ruo yu*, 'seemingly foolish', and the lowest grade, *shou zhuo*, 'content with being unskilful', were used as pen-names by many distinguished men.

At end of this list, Chapter 12 of the *Qi Jing Shi San Pian* adds: 'Outside these nine grades are countless players who will never be able to enter the rankings, and about whom more need not now be said. The Classics say: "Those who are born with knowledge are the highest class; those who study and get knowledge are next; those who are dull but study are next again."'

This latter is actually a reference to the *Analects* of Confucius¹⁰ where an even lower class is added at the foot of the list: those who are dull and do not study.

But Confucius did not put us go players in that category. He also said: 'Even playing go is better than being idle.'

Notes

1. *Shi Shuo Xin Yu*, IX, 15.

2. *Meng Zi* (Book of Mencius), Gao Zi (VI, A, 9).

3. See my article *Go on the Roof of the World* in *Go World* 58.

4. *Sun-Lü Yipu de Zhenwei* (Is the Sun-Lü game genuine?), in *Wei Qi* No. 103 (May 1990).

Continued on page 56.

Now Visit Ishi Press in London!

Not since the days of the London Go Center have European players had the convenience of a direct outlet for Ishi Press products in Europe. Now you do. Our new office in northwest London stocks the complete range of products from books and software to traditional Go bans. Just like our California office, in London we offer the most complete selection of Go products in the western world. You will also find a marvelous selection of puzzles, plus Shogi, Chinese Chess, and Mah Jong.

Ishi Press London is located at 20 Bruges Place off Baynes Street, 100 yards from the Camden Road BR station and within walking distance of the Camden Town Underground station. Come by, write for a catalogue, or call us at 071-284-4898 (FAX: 071-284-4899). We look forward to serving you.

Test Your Go Strength

50 Whole Board Problems

by

Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan

How strong are you? Here's a book that will test your perceptiveness in the opening, middle game, and endgame.

Miyamoto has selected 50 situations that might arise in typical games. In each he poses the challenge to find the best of five suggested points. Will your answer be the best play or the worst? Regardless, you will find a clear explanation of the virtues and drawbacks of each move. As you work your way through this book, you will discover the strengths and weaknesses of your own game, and you will gain an understanding of how to increase your playing strength.

You will also gain an indication of what your rating may be, but, more important, you will exercise your go judgment, so that you can avoid bad moves and find powerful plays in your own games. (Previously published as *G18: What's Your Rating?*)

Available now. VISA, Mastercard, Access orders welcome.

Price: North America \$12.95 + \$1.50 shipping/handling

Europe £8.95 + £1 shipping/handling

ISBN 4-87187-018-9



ISHI PRESS
INTERNATIONAL

76 Bonaventura Dr., San Jose, CA 95134 U.S.A.
20 Bruges Place, Baynes St., London NW1 0TE U.K.

多々七ツヤ
瀬川菊之丞

豊後守

